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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

Emerging Trends in Marine Insurance

Degree:

MSc

This dissertation analyses the emerging trends in the marine insurance industry with
specific reference to the structural changes in the mutual P&I Clubs. The marine
insurance industry as a service industry is subject to pressures sometimes under estimated
but they exist and they are increasing. The impact of such changes specially the changes
in the general insurance industry that has influence on the mutual clubs in the marine
insurance industry is examined. Recently, the mutual P&I clubs has witnessed the
pressure of a review by the European Commission of International Group Agreement and
competition from fixed premium providers. The mutual clubs are responding to these
challenges by providing range of services including one-stop- shop service through Joint
ventures or alliances with the corporate players. The development of information
technology, the commoditisation of insurance services and competition by products on
the basis of price rather than historical relationships are undermining the insurance
relationship, which continues to be at the heart of the most marine mutual insurers. The
above aspect raises the question on the survival of concept of mutuality. The concluding
chapter analyses the impact of various factors which influences the demtualisation of
mutual clubs such as cash flow, free reserves, access to capital, size of the insurer,
management and administrative expenses, underwriting losses, rate of investment income
and ratings from specialised rating agencies. Analysis of results show that the P&I clubs
Skuld and Steamship mutual have strong tendency towards demutualisation, the clubs
London and Japan have a weak tendency towards structural changes and the other clubs
are favourably positioned towards structural changes. The recommendations emphasise
the challenges and trends and the need for reorientation of mutual clubs.
KEYWORDS: Marine insurance, Demutualisation, Structural changes, P&I clubs, Fixed
premium providers
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
As the marine insurance companies stand on the brink of a new millennium they are
facing tougher competition than would have seemed possible a few decades ago. And
the state of the marine insurance industry today is the direct result of the incredible
transformation of the overall financial services industry and in particular the general
insurance industry. Over the past 20 years staggering changes have taken place in the
global general insurance environment. Companies in the insurance industry are currently
facing a number of challenges and trends inter-alia globalisation of markets,
consolidation and specialisation, increased competition from new competitors, new
products and alternative distribution channels, changes in customer needs, changes in the
security perception of vessel operation, reducing margins and increasing costs,
increasing sophistication and complexity of information technology including ecommerce and increased risk requiring innovative risk transfer vehicles. (Geib Gerd,
2001.p.1)

1.1

Do these changes in the general insurance industry create any impact in the

marine insurance industry?

Shipping being a specialised industry has so far insulated itself from the developments
that have been taking place in the general insurance industry. The new entrants into the

marine insurance market have taken knowledge from other industries and applied it to
the marine sector. This includes knowledge on customer behaviour, distribution, brands,
perception and service. The brand values of mutual clubs, which relied on shipowner’s
trust and reliability, which seemed to belong to the marine insurance industry for so long,
are no longer enough to provide sustainable competitive advantage for the traditional
players. Thus the changes that are taking place in the general insurance industry are
relevant to shipping. Shipping is an international industry subject to unique
environmental, political, and commercial considerations. Marine insurance as a service
industry, which exists to provide the ship owner the cover that he needs has to operate
on a global basis and is subject to all pressures sometimes under- estimated but they
exist and they are increasing (Taylor, 2000.p.22).

The events of the past few years, the review by the European Commission (EC) of the
International Group Agreement (IGA), the decision to limit the amount of cover under
P&I by the mutual clubs and the incredible interest in P&I shown by commercial
insurers have sparked considerable debate about the functioning of mutual clubs. In June
1999 the DGIV of the EC granted a ten-year exemption to the IGA until February 2009
subject to the condition that there should be competition among clubs who are members
of the IGA and all the clubs should publish their Average Expense Ratios. With the
increasing transparency and changes in the reporting standards consequent to the EC
investigation, S&P developed a full rating process for the P&I clubs and many clubs
voluntarily opted for interactive ratings (made with the cooperation of the insurer) which
was first published in 1999. The mutual clubs went through a process of review that
resulted in the merger of the Liverpool & London and Newcastle Club with North of
England Club and the demutualisation of British Marine Mutual, London. The mutual
clubs also started examining their weaknesses in comparison to the commercial insurers,
namely the unbudgeted supplementary calls. Consequently the UK Club announced a
new reinsurance arrangement with Swiss Re designed to support it’s solvency position
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without the need for unbudgeted calls, which is the new trend evolving among other
mutual clubs (Sydenham, 2000.pp.4-5).

1.2

What is the impact of the entry of fixed premium providers in P&I?

The other development that has been noticed in recent years is the increased retention of
risk by the clubs both individually and collectively through the group pool system. The
group clubs have repeatedly indicated their readiness to increase the pool’s retention of
risk should reinsurance rates rise and it is a major benefit of the pool and it’s spread of
risk that the clubs have this flexibility. The S&P report identified that the major issues
facing the marine mutual insurance market is consolidation, diversification and
demutualisation. If consolidation of mutual clubs takes place the International Group
could end up with far fewer members resulting in lack of choice for the shipowners,
which may drive more business to the fixed premium market. The mutual clubs are
combating the threats from the fixed premium competitors by providing a range of
services through joint ventures or alliances with the corporate players. This may pose a
danger to the clubs since the corporate players who are entering into joint ventures may
desire to have a firm hold on the mutual clubs affecting their freedom and possibly
resulting in a take over.

1.3

Impact of information technology

The impact of technological development, especially information technology, on the
insurance industry is phenomenal. Delivery systems for insurance products have become
much more sophisticated. In contrast to the personal one to one approach of brokers with
underwriters nowadays the shipowners have direct access to information on availability
of insurance cover and terms and conditions of cover from all over the world and decide
on the insurer who is best suited to the interest of the shipowners. The major

3

disadvantage in such a system would be testing the reliability of the insurer but looking
into the credit ratings given by the reputed credit rating agencies can solve this tricky
issue. The technological development, therefore, constitutes a direct attack on the
relationship insurance, which continues to be at the heart of the most marine mutual
insurers. The technology therefore contributes to the commoditisation of insurance
services, which in turn encourages competition by products on the basis of price rather
than historical relationships. The individual shipowners who are members of the mutual
club are aware of the alternatives and they may refuse to cross-subsidise other members
of the mutual clubs who contribute less to the bottom line (Wilderman, 2001. pp.2-5)

1.4

Emerging force in marine insurance industry –E-commerce

Another area where competition seems set to increase is electronic payments processing
and provision of insurance services over the Internet. This is a global phenomenon that
will certainly affect the marine mutual industry. Non- financial firms which means the
non-marine insurance providers, who control communication networks and the gateways
could set themselves up as brokers directing customers to the best product. (Brinson,
2000. p.15). The loyalty of the customer would increasingly be to the broker rather than
the producer of the product or the one who actually provides the insurance service. What
is the immediate impact of such a development? At the very least this process will
squeeze the margins of traditional insurance providers. It is also highly likely that there
are non-financial firms offering such services who would be in a position to design a
new product by using the information available to them through data mining technology.
Whether such a product will start competing with the traditional product offered by
segmented insurance service providers is important. Let us say a popular web portal can
offer an integrated service of P&I, Hull, Cargo and FD&D cover from various insurers
by combining the best, which meet the specific needs of the shipowners and call it new
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product. In such a case the brand value of the original segmented product, namely the
insurer of P&I or Hull or cargo loses it’s importance.

1.5

Is there any trend towards demutualisation of mutual clubs?

The world wide insurance industry was dominated by mutuals only a decade ago. Since
then there has been a trend towards demutualisation, which saw many mutual insurance
companies in the life insurance sector demutualising in the last decade. A report from
Reuters (2000) observes that the mutual insurance companies reforming as joint stock
companies may be a mistake, and the current trend to demutualise may stop, or even
reverse. The report noted that some mutuals planning to convert to stock ownership,
such as Metropolitan Life in the U.S., did just the reverse earlier this century, and said
the trend may yet swing back to favour mutual ownership.
One of the biggest reinsurers Swiss Re also said in its latest report (Sigma report,
1999.p.34) that mutual insurers have some fundamental advantages over joint-stock
competitors and should reconsider the decision of rushing to demutualise. The current
trend would show up to 10 large insurers abandoning mutual status over the next three
years. Among the big names slated to demutualise are the U.S.'s two largest life insurers,
Prudential and Metropolitan Life, and the four largest Canadian life insurers. In the UK,
life insurers NPI and Scottish Widows are in the process of demutualising after being
acquired by other companies. The trend was set by Swiss Life, Norwich Union and
AMP, which demutualised in 1997 and 1998. Sigma report said life insurers were
demutualising to make capital access and acquisitions easier, but warned that this meant
losing the mutual's cost advantage of having no customer-owner conflicts. The report
observed that the mutuals, without any short-term shareholders to please have the
advantage of flexible pricing and long-term investment. The demutuality is an option
open to mutual clubs to expand their business and accessing capital by becoming joint
stock companies. Demutusalisation requires significant changes to P&I club’s corporate

5

culture. A move to fixed premium inherently points to a shareholder’s interest approach
as opposed to the mutually beneficial concept. There are considerable differences
between the financial structure of mutual and corporate organisations. Demutualised
clubs will no longer be able to make supplementary calls to members to cover greater
than expected losses so they will have to back their underwriting with appropriate capital.
The demutualised corporate entity cannot rely entirely on providing P&I insurance cover
since this may result in a narrow business review of concentrating on one type of
business sourced from one industry. This is primarily due to the fact that shipping being
a cyclical industry, a slump in the shipping industry will affect the bottom line of the
insurance business. The clubs that demutualised in the last three years were British
Marine Mutual (BMM) providing P&I cover, Charterers’ Mutual providing cover for
charterers and Transmarine providing cover for strike and disruption. The increasingly
competitive nature of the P&I market might influence mutual clubs to opt for merger
rather than demutualisation as in the case of two big P&I clubs Britannia and Standard,
who negotiated for a merger last year, which, however, finally fell through. Mr.Todd of
syndicate 329 observed that ‘the rush to demutualise may be pushed to one side while
merger

mania

sweeps

through

the

market.

Consolidation

is

easier

than

demutualisation’(Beatty,1990.p.19).
Apart from demutualisation, there are certain considerations that are driving
merger and acquisition activity across the insurance industry for the purpose of capital
allocation, competitive positioning and pressures for global presence. Many insurance
companies are seeking mergers and acquisitions to gain benefits of scale and hoping that
they benefit from lower costs, improved time to market, greater flexibility and more
attractive positioning to investors. In this project I propose to analyse what these
changes mean for marine insurance companies and what the industry will look like in
the coming years.
The topic, emerging trends in marine insurance industry - demutualisation of
mutual clubs was chosen because it reflects author’s concern for the changes that are
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taking place in the general insurance industry which are likely to have influence in the
marine insurance industry. The author, having a financial and maritime administration
background, believes that the trends in general insurance industry need to be thoroughly
analysed for the cause that may contribute to the mutual clubs. This belief, indeed
influences author’s decision for choosing this topic.
Many books have been written about P&I clubs but not many have been formally
written about emerging trends or demutualisation of mutual clubs in the marine
insurance industry. The material that influences this work is obtained through different
sources such as books from the WMU library, (Stephen Hazelwood, Gaskell, Phil
Anderson, Christopher Hill, Drewry Insurance report …), texts from technical seminars,
conferences (Mare Forum,2000, IUMI,2000… ), P&I review reports (Elysian, Marsh
HSBC …), Personal e-mail enquiries to various P&I clubs, discussion with shipowners,
insurance brokers and managers of insurance clubs during field visits (Greece, London,
Bremen…), personal discussion with visiting Lecturers (Mr.Claes Lindh, Mr.Svensson,
Dr.Harlambides…) and a variety of marine periodicals, websites and lecture notes. The
topic is difficult, to the author of course because of the availability of limited research
material. However, it is interesting. His passion for the subject is motivation behind this
work.
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CHAPTER 2
DYNAMICS OF MARINE INSURANCE
2.1

Legal regime for marine insurance

The Marine insurance was practiced as the early as twelfth century by Lombards
and the members of the Hanseatic League introduced it to England. The institution
for providing marine insurance in the UK started with the Lloyds coffee house in
the seventeenth century. Lloyd’s developed the standard marine policy called the
Lloyd’s S.G (Ship &Goods) in 1779 and it remained in use until 1982.The S.G
form is given as the sample of form of policy in the First Schedule to the Marine
Insurance Act, 1906. During 1982 a new simplified policy document evolved
called MAR form keeping in view the changing needs of the industry.
(Gaskell,1987,p.500).

2.2

Types of Marine Insurance

The most important types of insurance in the marine insurance market are Hull and
Machinery (H&M), Protection & Indemnity (P&I), Freight, demurrage and
defence (FD&D), War risk, and Strike insurance. The H&M covers the ship, the
equipments on board the ship including the propulsion and auxiliary machinery,
cargo handling and navigation equipments and similar items of plant. H&M also
covers the ship’s contribution to general average, salvage and ¾ th of the liability
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to the other vessel in collision. The P&I insurance cover the ship owner against the
third party liabilities, which are covered under other insurance policy (Wijnost and
Wergeland, 1997.p.216). FD&D insurance provides insurance for legal costs and
technical support and assistance to defend or prosecute a wide range of uninsured
claims and disputes. P&I clubs offer this type of insurance as an additional class of
insurance. The War Risks insurance provides cover if the vessel finds itself in a
war zone or other areas of hostilities since the normal H&M and P&I insurance are
likely to be suspended. Strike insurance covers insurance of losses, which are
consequent to strike at the ports or during the performance of a voyage. A ship
owner or manager usually buys cover for financial consequences of damage to his
own ship, damage to other people’s property or death or injury to people. A
charterer specifically a time charterer, has insurance similar to the ship owner.
Cargo owners requirements are usually confined to loss or damage to cargo.

2.3

Application of various International conventions

For the shipping industry, being international in character, the operational
requirements of a ship in international trade are primarily governed by various
International conventions mainly the conventions of the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO), International Labour Organisation (ILO), UNCTAD, Comite
Maritime International (CMI) and the port state regulations where the ship is likely
to trade. IMO is entrusted with the responsibility of maritime safety including
prevention of pollution of the marine environment. The important conventions of
IMO in this respect are SOLAS1974, MARPOL1973/78, STCW 1978/95,
CLC1969/92,

LLMC1976/96,

FUND1971/1992,

and

HNS1996.

These

conventions impose certain minimum standards on the operation and maintenance
of ships, which are important considerations for the marine insurers for the
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efficient management of risk (Donner, 2000). The application of ISM, which has
direct implications on marine insurance, is discussed here under.

2.3.1

Impact of Implementation of ISM code

This code has come into partial operation from 1st July 1998 for certain types of
ship and it is fully applicable from 1st July 2002 for all types of ships. The ISM
code focuses on improving and establishing sound management standards so as to
provide safeguards against accidents caused by errors on the part of the shipboard
and shore management. Therefore the implementation of the ISM code has a wide
range of implications on the parties who are connected with the operation of a ship,
namely charterers, cargo owners, insurance companies, financiers, ship brokers,
underwriters and the classification societies. The UK P&I club’s recently
published study of major claims has identified the causes of such major claims
which include deck officer error (25%), crew error (17%), equipment failure (9%),
structural failure (9%), shore error (9%), pilot error (5%), mechanical failures (5%)
and engineer officer error (2%) (UK P&I Club, 2000, p.19). If we look at the
above findings we can conclude that the majority of the identified errors were
human errors and following the safe practices laid down under the ISM code could
minimize human error. In support of this statement, the statistics on voluntary
compliance show a reduction of 10% in liability insurance, 7-8% in P&I premium,
40% in lost man hours, 40% in pollution fines and the damage to container claim
has fallen from $2million to $20,000 (Skuld, 1998) (Mary Bond, 1999). Proper
implementation of international conventions would help in reducing the losses and
would consequently reduce claims. In the competitive environment the mutual
clubs are required to find ways and means of reducing their cost and any effort to
minimize the loss would improve their bottom line. Mr. Frederick Kruse of the
Swedish Club (The Swedish Club, 1999) in his paper presented at the P&I
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conference 2000 in London, stated that he is of the view that the competitive
factors in future take many forms and one of them is loss prevention. The Swedish
club made an analysis of the impact of ISM and found that the hull claims record
of ships subject to the ISM code’s first dateline (July, 1,1998) is some 30% better
than that of vessels subject to the Phase II deadline (July, 1,2002).

2.4

Economic aspects of the marine insurance

The marine insurance market is one of the largest segments in the shipping market
apart from shipping finance and freight. The International Trade Reports from
WTO (WTO report, 2001) have quantified the volume of world trade for the year
1999-2000 at 5.3 billion tonnes and the value of the trade for the year 1999-2000
to cost US$ 5473 billion for exports and US$5729 billion for imports. The cost of
the transportation process is estimated to be 4-5% that works out to around
US$250 billion and of this the cost of marine insurance is estimated to be
US$8.8.Billion. The cost of marine insurance forms an important component of
ship operation costs (around 5 %-10% of the cost of transportation) and therefore
the extent of the insurance cover and obtaining competitive rate for obtaining such
cover from various service providers is important for the ship owner (Drewry,
1998.pp.7-8). The global marine insurance market could be divided into two major
markets, one in London and the other forming the rest of the world. The London
marine insurance market is estimated to be around 30% of the global market due to
the legacy inherited by London that many international insurance companies used
to conduct their business from London.
The major players in the London insurance market could be divided into
three categories, namely Lloyd’s, other insurance companies and the Mutual club
operators. The shares of business of different markets in 1998 are as under
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Table 1 Market share of London market(1998) (Figures in US$ billion)

London market

Rest of the world

Lloyd’s

2.52

Japan

2.38

Other companies

1.95

USA

1.26

Mutual clubs

1.11

Other countries

6.02

Mutual clubs

0.70

Total

5.58

10.36

Percentage

30%

70%

Source: Modified from Drewry report on Marine Insurance, 1998(p.8).

The above table clearly shows the dominance of the London market in
marine insurance with other big markets in the USA and Japan.
If we look at the global figures estimated for different types of marine insurance,
the details are as follows

Table 2 Market share of different types of insurance (1998)
Type of Insurance

Volume(US$ bn)

Market share

1

Marine cargo

7.27

45%

2

Hull

4.34

27%

3

P&I

1.68

11%

4

Marine Liabilities

1.54

10%

5

Marine Offshore

1.11

7%

Total

15.94

100%

Source: Modified from Drewry report on Marine Insurance, 1998(p.8)

The above table clearly shows that the major share of the marine insurance market
is towards cargo insurance followed by hull and P&I cover.
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In addition the share of major countries that are involved in the marine insurance is
given below. The Table 3 shows that Japan is leading the overall marine insurance
market with market share on premium of about 17% followed by UK. If we look at
the sectoral analysis UK has predominant position in hull and offshore market with
market share of about 18% and 57% respectively. In the case of marine liabilities
market more than three fourth of the market is held by USA, UK and Norway.
This clearly shows the declining role of UK and shift of concentration from UK
market to Japan market.

Table 3

Proportion of premium revenue in 1997 (in percentage)

Country

Hull

Cargo

Liability

Offshore

Total

Japan

14.4

22.1

2.8

2.3

17.4

UK

18.1

7.9

23.1

57.6

14.9

USA

7.6

9.1

31.5

12.0

10.5

Germany

3.1

13.9

0

0

9.1

France

10.4

8.4

2.0

8.0

8.5

Italy

6.4

6.9

2.4

2.8

6.2

Norway

9.0

0.7

27.4

12.5

5.6

Netherlands

3.5

2.9

0

0

2.7

Spain

4.0

2.5

0

0

2.6

Australia

2.6

2.2

1.3

0.9

2.2

Source: IUMI Report, 1999

2.5

Main Players in the Marine Insurance market

The oldest marine insurance market, Lloyd’s in London is not an insurer and
individuals who operate syndicate on their own account place the insurance at
Lloyd’s. Only Lloyd’s authorised brokers can conduct the business at Lloyd’s and
being Lloyd’s brokers provides them the opportunity and direct access to large
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marine underwriting activity. The International Underwriting Association (IUA)
(IUMI, 1999) explains the importance of the London insurance market in the
following terms.
‘’The market includes virtually all the world's top international insurance and
reinsurance companies, which conduct business worldwide from their London
operations. Currently there are 108 Syndicates, about 100 insurance and
reinsurance companies, 39 Marine Protection and Indemnity Clubs and 127
brokers operating in the market. London writes an estimated 25% of the world's
international reinsurance, at least 30% of marine insurance and 42% of aviation.
Lloyd's London is the world's second largest commercial insurer and eighth largest
reinsurer ’’.
During 2001, London markets have the capacity to accept premiums worth
around £11 billion, and have licenses to trade in 64 territories around the world.
The market has an A+ rating from Standard & Poor's.’’
Apart from above, there are other major organizations, which operate as
companies, and they are classified into 3 groups (Drewry, 1998 p.20)
1. Institute of London Underwriters (ILU) & London International Insurance
and Reinsurance Market Organisation (LIRMA). ILU provides insurance and
reinsurance services and LIRMA provides insurance to non-marine activities.
ILU had 46 member companies writing hull and cargo liability insurance at
the time of merger with LIRMA.
2. Joint Committees:
A number of individual syndicates, which underwrite both at Lloyd’s and
ILU, form these committees and they play technical, educational and
advisory roles.
3. London Underwriting Committee (LUC) & International Union of Marine
Underwriters (IUMI)
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LUC has a relatively small part of the marine insurance market in London. IUMI
acts as an association of Underwriters, who organizes annual meetings and offers a
forum for a number of marine insurers to lobby their views and try to reach some
consensus in the marine underwriting practice. Apart from the London markets
there are other markets primarily for Hull in western Europe (Norway, Germany,
Switzerland, & France) and Eastern Europe (relatively small). A significant
portion of the marine insurance market is operated by the Mutual insurers who
provide insurance for P&I, Hull and Transport (ISL, 2000.pp.7-15).

2.6

Cost of marine insurance on the ship operational cost

The marine insurance cost forms approximately 5-10% of the operational cost of a
ship. The cost of Hull and P&I insurance vary from ship to ship depending on the
reputation and experience of owner or manager, claims record, size of fleet,
voyage pattern, nature of cargo, type of vessels, value of the vessel, flag, year of
build, tonnage, main machinery, class, compliance with international conventions
namely ISM, OPA90, CLC, HNS…etc and nationality of crew (Drewry, 1998
pp.74-76). The cargo insurers and insurers of marine liabilities also seek similar
information but with special emphasis on cargo details. The indicative ship
insurance cost obtained by M/S Ensign Marine Consultancy Ltd for the year 1998
is given in Table 4.

Table 4 Indicative Ship Insurance Cost (in US$)

VESSEL TYPE

DECLARED

HULL/IV

VALUE

WAR

P&I

TOTAL

RISKS

GeneralCargo(5000GT)

5,000,000

40,000

2,500

25,000

67,500

Reefer(9000GT)

18,000,000

92,000

9,000

40,000

141,000

Ro-Ro(15,000GT)

12,000,000

70,000

6,000

45,000

121,000
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LPG/LNG(30,000GT)

50,000,000

1,75,000

20,000

50,000

245,000

Bulk (35,000GT)

15,000,000

70,000

7,500

60,000

137,500

Container(50,000GT)

80,000,000

250,000

30,000

75,000

355,000

Tanker(100,000GT)

60,000,000

150,000

22,500

90,000

262,500

Passenger(60,000GT)

200,000,000

500,000

60,000

250,000

810,000

Source: Modified from Drewry report on Marine Insurance, 1998(p.8)

The analysis of the figures shows that there is a wide variation in insurance cost
depending on type of ships namely the passenger ships, tankers, LPG/LNG vessels
and container vessels having higher cost for insurance in comparison to general
cargo and bulk carriers. The figures in the table depend on following assumptions
1. Reputable manager and flag
2. Vessels are not singleton but part of large entity
3. Classed with IACS member
4.

Less than 15 years old, well maintained and recently surveyed

5. ITC clauses include ¾ RDC with Hull and ¼ RDC with P&I
6. Increased value and disbursements about 10% of Hull value
7. Values in US$
The cost of insurance varies depending on the following factors. In the case of a
20-year-old vessel the insurance cost may go up by 20%. Similarly, if the vessel
insured were singleton the cost would be up by 10%. The claims record also
influences the cost of insurance varying from 5% to 60% depending on the level
above break-even loss ratio.

2.7 Analysis of data of various types of claims and identifying major risk
areas in the operation of ships
The UK P&I club in their report on the analysis of major claims for the period
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1987 to 1997 identified the following principal risk groups by value of claims

Table 5 Principal risk groups by value of claims

Nature of claim

Share (in terms of
value)

Cargo

26%

Personal injury crew

13%

P&I Non crew

7%

Pollution

19%

Property damage

16%

Collision

10%

Others

9%

Source: UK P&I Club (2000.p.93)

From the above it may be seen that the cargo claims constitute the largest major
share of claims followed by claims for pollution damage and property damage.The
above analysis also identified the factors namely deck officer error (30%),
structural failure (20%), shore personnel error (15%), equipment failure (10%) and
Others (25%) as the major causes of damage.The above findings clearly show that
the majority of the insurance claims occur due to human error, which could be
minimized by following safe practices on board ship. The implementation of ISM
and STCW in true spirit will greatly help in reducing such claims, which will be
beneficial to both shipowners and insurers in minimizing the cost of insurance.The
above analysis by the UK P&I Club (UK P&I Club, 2000.pp.1-93) also provides
the following trends in respect of insurance claims
1. The number of claims is declining but the average value per claim has been
showing an increasing trend.
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2. The incidence of major cargo claims is declining. However on the other hand
the average value per claim is increasing.
3. Similarly the numbers of pollution incidents are declining but their average
value is far higher than the general average value of a claim since the
pollution claims are expensive.
4. The number of third party claims and personal injury claims also follow the
above trend and their average value is showing an increasing trend. Among
the personal injury claims the study reveals that the crew error injury claims
are much smaller than the non-crew injury claims viz. passengers, pilots,
stevedorers and other third parties.
The above findings clearly establish that in future the claims, even though fewer in
number are going to be substantial in value terms, which is a major concern to the
insurers. The insurers should find ways and means to avoid major claims, which
have a direct impact on their profitability and the cost of insurance.
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CHAPTER 3
MUTUAL INSURERS IN THE MARINE MARKET
3.1

Background of the concept of mutual insurance

The concept of mutuality for sharing the risk existed among the tribes in the early
civilizations of China, India, Babylon and Egypt. The formation of societies,
guilds, clubs and associations during the Greek and Roman civilizations
established the concept of mutuality for sharing the risks. The concept of mutuality
in marine insurance originated in UK with the formation of hull clubs in the early
part of the 18th century to guard against exorbitant insurance premia charged by the
monopolistic companies established by virtue of the Bubble Act of 1720 (UK).
Even though the Bubble Act restricted the operation of partnerships for insuring
marine risks, the mutual clubs operated as associations, which were considered to
be different from the partnership. (Hazelwood, 2000 p.2). The repeal of the Bubble
Act, 1720 (as amended in 1824) and the introduction of the Companies Act in
1862(UK) provided the legal framework for the operation of mutual clubs.
The mutual clubs for P&I insurance evolved in the mid 19th century on the
lines of mutual hull clubs, which had been in existence since the beginning of
eighteenth century. The necessity for P&I mutual clubs arose to meet the growing
needs of the shipowners who needed protection against the liabilities for loss of
life and personal injury under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 and also the risks
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not covered by the ordinary marine insurance. The number of collision accidents
also increased in number raising the concern of the shipowners. The Lloyds
statistical committee studied the reason for increase in the collision claims and
they gave findings that the number of collisions at sea increased after the
introduction of steamers. (Young, 1995, p.4). Traditionally the shipowner’s
liabilities were restricted to the value of the ship and freight and the liabilities,
which were in excess of them needed cover as in the case of one fourth of the
collision liabilities, which were not covered by the London under writers under the
Running Down Clause (RDC).

Table 6 THE IGA CLUBS

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11
12.
13.

NAME OF THE CLUB
American
Steamship Owners Mutual P&I
Association. Inc
Assurance Foreningen Gard
Assurance Foreningen Skuld
The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association
Limited
The Japan Shipowners Mutual P&I Association
The London Steamship Owners Mutual Insurance
Association Ltd
*The North Of England P&I Association
The Shipowners Mutual P&I Association
The Standard Steamship Owners P&I Association
Ltd
The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association
(Bermuda) Ltd
Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening
The United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Assurance
Association (Bermuda) Ltd
The West Of England Shipowners Mutual
Insurance Association (Luxembourg)

LOCATION
New York

SHORT NAME
American Club

Oslo
Oslo
London

Gard
Skuld
Britannia Club

Tokyo
London

Japan Club
London Club

New Castle
London
London

N Of E Club
Shipowners Club
Standard Club

London

Steamship Mutual

Gothenburg
London

Swedish Club
UK Club

London

W Of E Club

*Merged with the New Castle P&I association & Liverpool & London club

Source: Drewry Report on Marine Insurance,1998.p.47.

The first mutual liabilities company the Shipowners’ Mutual Protection Society
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was established in 1855. This was followed by the other associations who also started
offering P&I cover to their members. The members shared the risks of claims in
proportion to the tonnage of their ship. The concept of P&I expanded when the
shipowners required an indemnity for loss or damage to cargo when they were made
liable under the Act as in the case of ‘Western Hope’. There are about 16 mutual clubs
in existence out of which 13 are members of International club Group Agreement (IGA)
and the rest are non-IGA members. (Drewry, 1998.p.47). The list of clubs who are
members of the IGA may be seen above. The list of P&I insurers who are not members
of IGA are given below

Table 7

The Non-IGA P&I Insurers

Name

Location

1

British Marine Mutual Association
London
Limited
2.
The Charterers Mutual Assurance
London
Association Limited
Rostock
3.
Deutche Versicherungs-Und
Ruckversicherungs –AG(Darag) With
Gerling –Konzern AG
4.
Dragon Protection And Indemnity
London
5.
HIH Marine Insurance Services
London
6.
Lloyds And Companies (Various Markets) London
7.
Ocean Marine Mutual P&I Association
Brussels
Limited
8.
Osprey Underwriting Agency
London
9.
Southern Seas Agencies Limited
Florida
10. Terranova Insurance Company Limited
London
Source: Drewry Report on Marine Insurance, 1998 p.47.

Fixed/
Mutual
Mutual*
Mutual*
Fixed

Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Mutual*
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed

* Demutualised in 1998 & 1999 and have become fixed premium operator.

3.2

Sharing of risk in mutual Club

The arrangement of sharing the risk for members in the clubs who are members of
IGA is shown in Table 8 (Anderson, 1999.pp.30-34).
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1. Retention: The members of the pooling arrangement each bear their own
claims up to a maximum of US$ 5 million for each claim.
2. Pooling agreement: Claims in excess of retention and up to US$30 million are
shared by pooling in accordance with a percentage contribution allocated to
each club which is worked out based on premium income, entered tonnage and
pool recovery record.
3.

Excess reinsurance contract: In order to reduce the possibility of unexpected
calls on members the clubs developed a system of reinsurance and clubs used
to pool their claims for reinsurance in excess of a specified figure. This
arrangement helped sharing of heavy claims made against one club by other
members of the other clubs who are under the reinsurance pooling arrangement.
The first pooling agreement was concluded among 6 clubs based in London in
1899 called the London Group, which later became the International Group.

Table 8. Development of General excess of loss insurance limits and costs (in US$)
Year

Club retention

Pool retention

Limit

Cost per GT

Cost per GT

Tankers

Dry Cargo

1989

1,200.000

12,000,000

1,250,000,000

0.3165

0.1585

1990

1,600,000

12,000,000

1,250,000,000

0.4366

0.1789

1991

1,600,000

12,000,000

1,250,000,000

0.5722

0.2132

1992

2,000,000

15,000,000

1,050,000,000

1.3985

0.4062

1993

3,000,000

25,000,000

1,050,000,000

1.3873

0.3980

1994

4,000,000

30,000,000

1,180,000,000

1.4367

0.4214

1995

5,000,000

30,000,000

1,530,000,000

1.4367

0.4214

1996

5,000,000

30,000,000

1,500,000,000

1.2346

0.3061

1997

5,000,000

30,000,000

2,030,000,000

0.6786

0.2357

1998

5,000,000

30,000,000

2030,000,000

0.5479

0.1957

Source: Drewry Report on Marine Insurance, 1998.p.67
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Claims in excess of US$ 30 million and up to a maximum of US$ 500 million
(now raised to US$1 billion) for pollution claims and US$ 2 billion per claim
for other categories are covered by this reinsurance contract. The clubs also
share the reinsurance premium according to the tonnage entered in the club.
The rates vary according to the type of the tonnage with the oil tankers having
the highest rates per ton compared to bulk.
4. Overspill claims layer: The P&I clubs operated with unlimited liability till
recently but in 1996 a decision was made to introduce an upper limit based on
a percentage (2.5%) of the tonnage limitation figure (Article 6(1)(b) of
Limitation of Liability on Maritime Claims,1976 (LLMC,1976 convention) of
all the vessels entered in all the International Group clubs. In 1999 this amount
is estimated at US$ 4.25 billion.
The development of general excess of loss reinsurance limits and costs may be
seen in Table above, which shows that the club retention has increased from
US$1.2 million in 1989 to US$ 5 million in 2001 and the pool retention also
increased from US12 million in 1989 to US$ 30 million at present. The overall
limit for reinsurance also has increased from US$1.25 billion to US$2.03.billion.
The trend over the years has been one of gradual increase in the retention limit on
individual clubs and the pooling limit.

3.3

Legal Status of operation of mutual clubs

Most of the P&I mutual clubs are registered under the Companies Act relevant to
their jurisdiction as mutual benefit societies without share capital. (Hazelwood,
2000, p.13). The P&I associations in UK are registered under the Companies Act
as registered companies limited by guarantee with no share capital. Their members
are not shareholders since they do not subscribe to capital or share any profits. In
the relationship between the members and their club the overriding obligation is
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the mutual responsibility. The members contribute to the damages suffered by
other members by virtue of the obligations provided under the Articles of
Association and Rules of the club, which guarantee each other’s claims. This
arrangement works as network of reciprocal guarantees and it explains the nonprofit making nature of the clubs. The relationship between the members and their
club is laid down in the Articles of Association, which provide for the governance
of the club by the board of directors elected at the general body meetings and the
directors are bound to conduct the business as stipulated in the Articles of
Association. The Articles of Association also cover matters relating to the
qualification for entry into the club, termination and withdrawal of membership,
right to protection and indemnity, liability to contribute in the case winding up and
to pay the calls of the club. In most clubs the directors meet at regular intervals
every two or three months to decide on matters of general policy and to consider
the claims that require their approval. (Hazelwood, 2000, p.14) Many of the P&I
clubs in the UK have transferred their residences abroad and maintain registered
offices offshore. The clubs in the UK moved to offshore destinations not only to
obtain exemption from tax on investment income but also to guard against the
exchange rate fluctuations of the pound sterling since the companies registered in
the UK are bound to maintain their investments in sterling pounds that devalued
by more than 14% against the US Dollar in 1967 (Drewry, 1998). The matter of
fluctuation in currencies was important since most of the members of the mutual
clubs in the UK were non-British and the clubs were required to pay a large
proportion of their claims in currencies other than sterling. The offshore clubs
provided a cushion against the effects of devaluation, inflation fluctuation of
exchange rates and the burden of UK investment taxation (Hazelwood, 2000, p.18).

3.4

Management of P&I clubs

Nowadays the management of the P&I clubs is carried out by separate specialist
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legal entities either limited companies or partnerships who work for fee, based on
the entered tonnage, or by charging working expenses and salaries of their
employees. The management company normally carries out the day-to-day
administration of the club and the claims handling service. The managers are
responsible for the collection of calls, appointment of correspondents, claims
handling, underwriting, investments, signing policies, payment of claims and
maintenance of records and accounts. The powers of the managers are provided in
the Articles of Association of the club and the managers are authorized to enter
into contracts on behalf of the club. Many P&I clubs also have a network of
correspondents all over the world who assist the members of the club in dealing
with the claims. These correspondents act as service providers of the club on a
consultancy basis and they also conduct investigations on behalf of the club for
processing the claims (Hazelwood, 2000, p.23).

3.5

Basis of operation of various players in the mutual insurance

3.5.1

Insurers
The mutual market mainly consists of insurers who deal directly with the

shipowners or their brokers. The underwriters calculate the size of the call based
on the following factors
•

Member’s claims within the club’s own retention

•

Contribution to pool claims

•

Proportion of the excess reinsurance premium

•

Management expenses

•

Investments

The underwriter works out the rate for the Estimated Total Call (ETC) by using the
following formula:
Estimated Total Call

=

Basic Rate * Contributing or Entered Tonnage
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The basic rate represents the rate of premium assessed by the underwriter based on
the information collected by him. The club directors determine the proportion of
Advance Call, which is normally payable in two or more instalments throughout
the year. Apart from the above the clubs which are members of the international
group make provision in their rules for catastrophic claims or overspill claims and
these claims are incurred by the members of the club towards the claims of other
clubs in the group under the International Group Pooling Agreement (Hazelwood,
2000).

3.5.2

Role of agents and brokers

The intermediaries such as agents and brokers play a key role in the negotiation
and formation of marine insurance contracts. This practice started since the
beginning of Lloyd's Coffee House, which specialized in the marine insurance
market. The distinctive three-sided nature of marine insurance is that two
commercial parties, insurer and insured deal with one another through the medium
of a third, the broker. Brokers have always served as the intermediary between
insurer and insured, even when both parties are commercial entities that would be
quite capable of finding and negotiating with one another without assistance. From
the very beginning, when "office-keepers" were often traders and insurers
themselves, the broker has been in a uniquely independent position, with strong
legal and commercial links to both sides of the insurance contract. In contrast, an
insurance agent is more closely associated with one side of the insurance contract,
usually the insurers. The difference between an agent and a broker was explained
as follows by Lush J in Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v Brennans
(Horsham) Pty Ltd:
‘’[N]either of these is a term of precision but the broad distinction is between a
person, firm or company which carries on an independent business of placing
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insurance upon the instructions of clients and whose basic relationship of agency is
with the client, and the insurer's agent whose function is to procure persons to
insure with his principal, the insurer, and whose basic relationship of agency is
therefore with the insurer. In short, a broker usually acts for the insured and an
agent usually acts for the insurer’’. (Hazelwood, 2000,p.45)

3.5.3

Reinsurance

Reinsurance is an arrangement between insurance companies, wherein one
company (the ceding company) cedes a portion of a risk (policy, premium, and
losses) to the other insurance company (the assuming company or reinsurer).
Therefore the risk of loss is spread and a disproportionately large loss under a
single policy does not fall on one company. Reinsurers can be other insurance
companies or companies specializing in reinsurance only. (Hazelwood, 2000,p.110)
There are two types of reinsurance:
1.Facultative - reinsurance of one particular risk (policy) where the reinsurer
retains the right (faculty) to accept or reject each risk offered by the ceding
company.
2.Treaty - reinsurance (usually written on an annual basis) of an entire class of
business consisting of many policies, where the ceding company agrees to cede
and the reinsurer agrees to assume all of the risks (policies) of a particular class of
business.
When a ceding company places either facultative or treaty reinsurance, the
reinsurance is usually placed on one of the following bases:
•

Pro-rata or Quota share – reinsurance: The reinsurer shares a pro rata portion
of the premium and losses of the ceding company on a fixed percentage basis;
e.g. 25%, 30%, or some other percentage.
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•

Excess of Loss Reinsurance: The reinsurer (subject to a specified limit) pays
100% of the losses of the ceding company in excess of a certain agreed limit
(e.g. $30,000,000 retention) either on a per risk basis or in excess of a certain
aggregate of all losses of a particular type (e.g. $10,000,000 for windstorm
losses). It includes various kinds of reinsurance: catastrophe, per risk, per
occurrence, and aggregate excess of loss (Hazelwood, 2000).

In the case of P&I, the International Group of clubs arranges excess loss
reinsurance in the market on behalf of the individual member clubs. The Drewry
Report on Marine Insurance (Drewry, 1998.pp.67-68) states that since 1994 the
excess loss reinsurance cut in at $30 million for each claim and the gradual trend
has been for the P&I clubs to take a greater share of the risk at the lower end and
to extend reinsurance to higher levels at the top end. The above report observed
that the shipowners are critical of the reinsurance programme since over the past
20 years only three cases have shown losses to reinsurance underwriters namely
Amoco Cadiz (1979) and Exxon Valdez (1989) and the reinsurance premium was
as high as US$360 Million in 1994.

3.6

Marine risks covered by P&I Clubs under Club rules

There are two principal forms of insurance covered under P&I namely liability
insurance, which places an obligation on the insurer to pay any damages which the
assured is likely to pay as a result of occurrences which are defined in his
insurance cover, and indemnity insurance, which places an obligation upon an
insurer to reimburse or indemnify an assured only to the extent that the assured has
incurred and discharged his liability. The insurers duty to indemnify does not arise
until the assured has paid damages to the third party. It is not necessary for a
member to have cover against all of the risks covered in a club’s rules and each
member may negotiate which risks he wishes to have covered and whether he
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wishes to bear deductibles in respect of any such risk. The risks normally covered
are given in the P&I rule book (Hazelwood, 2000, p.153). The information on
coverage of risks would clearly show that the shipowner with full P&I cover is
insured against all the liabilities from catastrophic oil spills, costly collision and
staggering loss of life to feeding stowaways, compensating passengers for loss of
luggage and bailing out drunken crew members from local gaols. (Hazelwood,
2000, p.153)

3.7

Current problems in the mutual insurance market

The major challenges faced by the mutual clubs could be classified as under
3.7.1

Losses
1. Underwriting losses
2. Increase in claims –increase in deficit –falling reserves
3. Increase in administrative cost

3.7.2

Relevance of concept of mutuality – survival of pooling agreement

A. Bilbrough & Co who are managers of the London P&I club (Edminston, 2001)
were of the view that the group unity is important for collective financial strength
and maximum financial security for about 87% of the World’s merchant fleet. The
International Group has real assets totalling about US$6billion to meet claims and
free reserves totalling about US$2 billion. The other advantage of the group
system is that the group has the largest reinsurance contract placed in the Lloyd’s
market that provides them the power to negotiate better rates. The system of club
letters of undertaking has wide acceptance and the group clubs do not default on
the payment of the claims.
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3.7.3

Competition within the IGA

Consequent to the investigation by European Commission (EC) and amendment
carried out by the IGA the clubs are allowed to freely quote their rates net of
management cost so that the competing clubs will have to match them in full. This
arrangement forces the clubs to cover their management cost out of their
investment income. This will also facilitate shipowners to enter their fleets in more
than one club and each of his clubs becomes a holding club and they can quote
freely on any of the new purchases of the shipowner. However, the major factor
which discourages the shipowner moving from one club to another is the release
call charged by the clubs to release a member, which is supposed to cover the
liability for future supplementary calls ( Edminston, 2001).

3.7.4 Competition from fixed premium insurers

The entry of fixed premium insurers in the recent years has triggered certain
changes in the P&I mutual market.
•

Fall in the rates of insurance premium

•

Reduction in average expense ratio of mutual clubs

•

Reduction in supplementary calls

•

Improvement in quality of service

However, the fixed premium insurers are small and offer no apparent advantage
other than the certainty that the clients will not have to pay supplementary calls.
The following fixed players have entered the market and some of them have the
backing of big players.
1. HIH - an Australian insurer (Collapsed recently)
2. Dragon –formed by a manager of mutuals
3. Terra Nova – a Bermuda based insurer
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4. Southern seas – backed by a American insurer
5. AXA - established big player in France
6. British Marine – Based in London

3.7.5

Changing needs of ship owners - One- stop-shop service

The one-stop-shop service means that one club or company that would cover the
comprehensive insurance needs of the shipowners by providing a wide variety of
insurance cover. Phil Mitchell of the United Insurance brokers is of the view that
the ‘’mutual market is moving towards the concept of ‘one stop shop’’, offering
multiple products to suit the customer’s insurance requirements. He pointed out
some recent developments like Thomas Millers & Company Limited, the
managers of the UK P&I club who have worked out a strategic alliance with Swiss
Re and they have positioned themselves similar to Tindall Riley to offer a multiple
product insurance service. The other mutual clubs also follow a similar approach
as in the case of the Steamship Mutual, which provides cover for cargo operators,
transporters, ports and harbours and tugs. The Gard Club provides administrative
services for insuring all marine and energy risks. The Swedish Club already
offered Hull, P&I and associated risk covers for many years. The North of
England Club also runs a hull mutual service. The Standard Club is also expected
to move in the same direction (Mitchell1, 2001).

3.7.6

Investigation by regulatory authorities on the practices

The European Commission (EC) considered the procedure forbidding the
International Group clubs from quoting a rate lower than that of a holding club as

1

Personal E-mail received from Mr. Phil Mitchell, United Insurance Brokers, London
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a restriction on freedom of competition and thereby violating the relevant
provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The European Commission also investigated
the value of the group pooling system and the need for rating under the
International Group Agreement (IGA). The previous limit on cover of US$20
billion was also considered by the EC to be too high. After several rounds of
negotiations the International Group (IG) Clubs had with the EC and certain
amendments made to the IGA, the EC granted a ten-year exemption from
European competition laws with effect from 20-2-1999. The previous exemption
from the EC expired in 1995.The European Commission finally approved the IGA
subject to two conditions that clubs will publish within their annual financial
statements their Average Expense Ratios, being the average of their management
expenses (excluding claims) as a proportion of the premium and investment
income over the last five years. The other condition is that there should be free
competition between clubs in terms of rating business in so far the rating relates to
management costs. (Crichton , 2000)

3.8

Emerging trends in the mutual insurance

3.8.1

Mergers, Alliances and Acquisitions
Similar to the shipping industry, which in recent years has been moving

towards consolidation with mergers, acquisitions and alliances, the international
insurance market is also heading towards market consolidation or polarisation. The
following consolidations in the international insurance industry have given some
major players a chance to increase their corporate power and diversify into new
fields including marine insurance. (Drewry, 1998.p.57)
1. Royal Insurance and Sun Alliance Insurance of the UK
2. AXA and UAP of France
3. Allianz and AGF of Germany/France
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4. AGF and RNV of France and the Netherlands
5. ING and BBL of the Netherlands.
6. Credit Suisse and Winterthur of Switzerland.
7. General Accident and Commercial Union of UK
8. Eagle Star and Zurich Re of UK/ Switzerland.
9. Exel and MidOcean Reinsurance of Bermuda (reinsurance company)
The summary of consolidation of mutual clubs market is given below.

Table 9

Consolidation of players in Mutual marine insurance

Alliance Partner
MOU with American Hull insurance Syndicate
for mutual cooperation & Support on cover,
service and capabilities
2.
Assurance Foreningen Gard
Sub contracted the management to a new
company Gard Services AS for the joint
marketing of hull and P&I insurance products
3.
Assurance Foreningen Skuld
Looking for alliance. Lost 2.5Million GT in
2000 renewal.
4.
The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association
Tindall Riley the managers of this club have
Limited
sold their entity to Allianz AGF MAT to offer
multi product service including hull insurance.
5.
Liverpool And London Steamship P&I
Merger arrangement with North of England to
Association Limited
transfer 5 Million GT.
6.
The North Of England Protecting &Indemnity
Offer hull insurance through MSMI. Merger
Association
arrangement with Liverpool and London to
acquire 5 Million GT
7.
The Standard Steamship Owners P&I Association Agreement with Tokyo marine & Fire
Ltd
Insurance company to provide P&I cover to
Japanese shipowners.
8.
Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening
Offer both Hull and P&I cover
9.
The United Kingdom Mutual Steamship
Reinsurance programme with Swiss Re to
Assurance Association (Bermuda) Ltd
protect the club’s free reserves to avoid the
additional calls. Thomas miller the mangers of
the UK club offer hull product Dex through
Swiss Re
Source: Compilation of data from P&I review 2000 of HSBC, Elysian Insurance services and Marsh.
1.

Name of the Club
American Steamship Owners Mutual P&I
Association. Inc

The above trend of consolidation among the insurance companies triggered a chain
reaction of consolidation among broking houses. The number of Lloyd’s brokers
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has reduced from 272 in 1983 to 206 in 2000.The Lloyd’s syndicates are also
consolidating either by leaving the market or by mergers. The syndicates
underwriting marine business have reduced from about 146 to 46 in the last ten
years. The P&I mutual clubs also started consolidating starting with the North of
England and The Newcastle merger in 1998.Similar mergers of the Liverpool Club
with the London Club and Skuld with the Swedish Club are predicted by some
reports. The trend of consolidation of P&I clubs will result in fewer, stronger and
more efficient clubs (Drewry, 1998.p.58). One of the views, which explains the
necessity for consolidation of P&I clubs is that the need to disclose administrative
costs and Average Expense Ratio of P&I clubs (consequent to the EC decision)
might force less efficient clubs to look for mergers (Crichton, 2000). This leads us
to the question of optimum size of the club where some experts are of the view
that the optimum size for any P&I mutual would be around 30 million tones GT
(Crichton, 2000). Mr. Phil Mitchell of the United Insurance Brokers also identified
the future trend towards mergers of P&I mutual clubs as well as support of the
clubs by the big players in the general insurance industry. He pointed out the
following arrangements

3.8.2

§

Allianz /AGF is buying the management of the Britannia

§

Swiss Re is supporting the UK P&I club

§

Munich Re has strong links with a number of other clubs

Can the P&I mutual insurers survive?

The views of the managers of the Britannia P&I club (Mitchell, 20012) is that,
volume is vital, quality is vital, pooling is vital and mutuality is vital. But they feel
that the pooling arrangement with other clubs might collapse under the stress of
competition, divergent business plans and pressure of all sorts. It is also thought
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that without the benefits of the pooling system the reinsurance is available at a
cheaper rate up to US$2 billion. Therefore, the product of mutual clubs which
have a pooling arrangement will be less distinguishable from that of it’s
competitors. The Britannia Club also feel that the backing of a big insurance group
like Allianz/AGF will help them to provide ‘one-stop-shopping’ for it’s clients by
providing insurance cover for Hull& Machinery and associated risks, other
transport risks, finance cover …etc. The P&I mutual clubs have survived almost
unchanged for a century in almost every respect. The system has relied on
stakeholder’s culture, pooling of risks, cohesion and benevolent monopoly.
Mr. Roger Ingles3 of Elysian Insurance Services (Ingles, 2001) observes
that the market needs a revival of either a non-IG Club or fixed alternative
otherwise it will lose it’s vibrancy as the EC are so keen to see. Therefore, the
competition between the clubs does exist but it is rather benign. The decay of the
fixed alternative in such a quick frame will allow the clubs to restore their pricing
levels to such that they may one day get closer to an underwriting profit but that
may be 2-3 years away. The rebirth of competition may quash that even happening.
Latest talk in the insurance sector is that the increases ranging from 10% to 20% in
premium are expected next February 2002 when the majority of cover falls due for
renewal. This may come as a shock to owners since they have enjoyed several
years of unchanged or fractionally higher payments and in many case rebates of
around 25% on ETC (Brewer, 2001.p.6). The owners appear to have little room for
manoeuvre in choice of cover as external competition has dwindled. The provision
of insurance at cost by the club has to be better for the owner than using a
commercial underwriter who will have cost of capital and profit based motives.
Reinsurance rates will continue to drive up prices unless the clubs simply selfinsure a greater amount of risk.
2
3

Personal E-mail received from Mr. Phil Mitchell, United Insurance Brokers, London.
Personal E-Mail received from Mr. Roger Ingles, Elysian Insurance Services, London.
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CHAPTER 4

ROLE OF FIXED PREMIUM INSURERS IN THE MARINE
INSURANCE MARKET
4.1

Concept of Fixed premium insurance

The fixed premium insurance is a commercial insurance service provided by
insurance companies established with the primary purpose of making profit.
The fixed premium refers to the predetermined premium for providing the
insurance cover based on a contract between an insurer and insured. In this
contract the insurer retains the component of risk by charging the insured a
fixed premium based on the expected value of losses. The risk is then either
assumed or reinsured or hedged or securitised (or combinations of these actions)
against the payment of premium. The risk premium is also required to
compensate shareholders and financial investors. (Looberge, 2001). The fixed
premium insurers provide the assured the certainty of cost. Since the
underwriter is expected to make a profit the cost to the assured, at least in
economic theory, would be higher than that for mutual insurance. Insurers who
are called commercial insurers, composite insurers, fixed premium providers or
non-mutual insurers, provide fixed premium insurance.
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4.2

Basis of operation of fixed premium insurers

The fixed premium segment (hereafter referred to as FP) is one of the largest
groups in the general insurance segment which offers life and property
insurance all over the world. The fixed premium providers (hereafter referred to
as FPP) are one of the four major marine markets listed below. (Nixon, 1987)
1.

Stock insurance companies

2.

Lloyds associations

3.

Mutual clubs

4.

Reciprocal or insurance exchanges

The FP segment falls under stock insurance companies, which are incorporated
business organisations organised as profit making ventures and owned by
shareholders. These companies are governed by the state where the company is
incorporated and they are obliged to satisfy the designated requirements of
capital and reserve funds. The contracts they issue are usually written for a
definitely stated consideration called premium. The insured receives no
dividends from the earnings of the company. The premium charged by the
insurance company is a fixed sum so that the insured knows exactly what his
protection will cost. The capital, surpluses and the reserves of the company help
to guarantee the payment of claims made by the assured and the assured cannot
be called upon to pay additional premium amounts in the event that the losses
are greater than anticipated. The insurer bears the risk as an entity separate and
apart from the assured. In a stock company management and control vests with
the stockholders. They elect the board of directors who in turn delegate the
authority to the officers of the company. A policyholder of a stock insurer is not
involved with the company beyond the payment or denial of indemnity when he
suffers a loss (Nixon, 1987).
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4.3

Responsibility of various players in the fixed premium insurance

4.3.1 Underwriters
The insurance company that underwrites the policy provides an assessment of
the FP for a particular vessel depending on various factors as in the case of
mutual clubs. The rates of premia of FPP’s are influenced mainly by their
performance in earlier years and reinsurance market rates since their focus is on
profit. FPP’s work under a pressure to maximise returns before the market
conditions favourable to them disappear. Most of the FPP’s offer limited cover
ranging from US$100 to 500 million (Crichton, 2000). The low premium
offered by FPP’s in comparison to mutual players may reflect low overheads
and light weight infrastructure. The underwriters of the fixed premium
insurance market operate through their agents who provide them the business.
The shipowners or insured normally approach the insurers through their brokers
who arrange the cover with the insurance company. The distinguishing feature
of the operation of underwriters in the fixed premium market is that there is no
direct link between the insurers and the insured and the insurer relies on the
intermediary to finalise the policy. The intermediaries or the brokers play a
crucial role in finalising the insurance contract.
4.3.2

Reinsurers

There is no distinction between the reinsurers in the fixed premium market and
the mutual market. The reinsurers operate in both markets. The reinsurers fix
the rate for the reinsurance arrangement depending on the volume of business
brought in by the original insurer. The bigger the volume the better the
reinsurance rates offered by the reinsurers. The FPP purchases reinsurance from
the reinsurance market to cover the risks over and above the deductibles
retained by the shipowner. In comparison to the mutual club, normally the
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FPP’s have no retention limit on the insurance policy and they have limited
capacity to purchase reinsurance since they provide P&I cover up to US$500
million as against US$4.25 billion (US$2.03billion for reinsurance ) provided
by the mutual club. In this respect the mutual clubs have the advantage of
obtaining better rates for reinsurance through the pooling system where the
reinsurance requirements of all the member clubs of the IGA are taken in one
lot. The ability of the clubs to underwrite liability risks at competitive rates is
based heavily on their ability to buy reinsurance on equally competitive terms.
Following successive reductions of twenty per cent in the rates under the
International Group Agreement reinsurance contract in 1998/99 and 1999/2000,
the negotiations for the 2000/2001 renewal produced a contract for two years at
a fixed price. The negotiations were held against a background of lower rates
and with fears that the reinsurance market might harden in the coming months.
In addition to the savings in the reinsurance premium, the limit for oil pollution
has been increased to $1billion from $500m. Overall, the group received a
reduction in reinsurance costs of about seven per cent.
4.3.3 Agents
The fixed premium insurers operate on a worldwide scale either through their
own offices or agents. The agents canvass for the business of the insurer for a
fee which is based on the amount of premium generated through his / her own
effort. The agents normally work for more than one insurance company (may
be competitors) offering multiple products to suit the needs of the customers.
4.4

Interrelationship between the Hull market and P&I market

The fixed premium providers are focussing on the P&I market due to the fact
that the profitability in the hull market has not been encouraging due to the fall
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in premium over the last ten years. The hull market has been suffering from a
structurally soft market for almost a decade now with the rates being at the
bottom due to overcapacity and fierce competition. Profits are no longer made
and the businesses are concluded without proper risk assessment since they are
cost driven. The hull underwriting market acts like a pure commodity market
with underwriters having no technical expertise. (Barr, 2000 p.173). The
underwriting losses are covered to a large extent by deductibles and reinsurance.
The competitive market also encourages insurance for substandard ships. The
advent of the mutual clubs assault on the hull market may be much sooner.
Swedish Club already does, the Gard, the North of England and the UK clubs
do to a limited degree and the Standard, the Steamship and the Britannia seem
to be plotting an entry later this year. American Club has hooked up with AHIS
to provide hull insurance. (Ingles, 2001)
Similarly the entry of FPP is triggered certain changes in the liability market
(P&I). In the last two years we have seen a trend of mergers and
demutualisation efforts on the part of mutual P&I clubs. The end of the
Liverpool and London Club, the Ocean Marine Mutual being put into
provisional liquidation, and British Marine Mutual changing its status from a
mutual insurer to a fixed premium provider are some of the developments. The
Jonathan Jones syndicate at Lloyd's, which has built up a significant portfolio of
P&I business, has moved into the fixed premium P&I market. According to
Nigel Russell (2000), Director of the marine division of Lloyd's broker HSBC
Insurance Brokers (HSBC, 2000.pp.2-7) has said, "If commercial insurers take
a significant market share from the mutual clubs, it is very likely that the clubs
will have to respond by offering their members a higher level of service on
other insurances." HSBC's recently released Protection and Indemnity Review
notes that fixed premium competition may already be manifesting itself in the
mutual market in another way as many clubs announced that they were
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changing their basis of calls. The reasons for these changes, says HSBC, may
be twofold. Firstly, the idea of charging a supplementary call can be seen as a
disadvantage in terms of the clubs' ability to compete against fixed premium
facilities. Secondly, the rating agencies give the clubs little or no credit for their
ability to collect supplementary calls, and indeed are very unhappy about
supplementary calls in general. From a marketing point of view HSBC says that
the budgeted supplementary calls are no longer popular, even though they
might be good for owners' cash flow. In an increasingly competitive insurance
industry, the other clubs are trying to reduce or eliminate the supplementary call
from their bases of collecting premiums.
4.5

Consolidation of syndicates in the Lloyd’s market

The continuous trend of falling premium rates in the Hull and P&I markets as
well as the cargo markets has an impact on the number of syndicates who
operate in the Lloyd’s market either by closing down their business or merging
their activity with someone else to survive in the market. The capacity trends at
Lloyd’s also show a steady decline in the number of marine syndicates (Molck
Ude, 2000). The results below clearly show consolidation of various syndicates

Table 10

Capacity trends at Lloyd’s market

Year

Capacity at Lloyd’s
US$ millions
1989
6738
1991
6139
1993
5615
1995
5615
1997
5550
1998
5690
1999
5840
Source: IUMI, 2000

Number of
syndicates
134
106
62
46
42
39
40
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Total
capacity
15723
16397
13103
15199
15349
15124
14675

at Lloyd’s, who are responding to overcapacity and falls in the rates in the
recent years. The major drop in the number of syndicates is seen for the period
1991 to 1992 when the market turned drastically with huge losses.

4.6 Comparative analysis of fixed premium insurance providers and
mutual P&I clubs

The data obtained from 13 P&I clubs and fixed premium insurers with
reference to their structure, operation, cover, claims handling and services were
analysed and the essential differences between the two segments are given
below. (Gerits, 2000)

Table 11

Comparison of fixed premium insurance providers and
mutual P&I clubs

Profit

Mutual P&I Clubs (IGA)
Non profit making organisation

Incorporation

Incorporated as mutual company
under the companies act of the
relevant jurisdiction

Capital

There is no share capital

Entry of
Members/
Shareholders

Membership open only to those
who have insured their ship and
entry into the club through strict
process of scrutiny of the fleet and
reputation of the shipowner or the
management company.
The premium is called ‘calls’ and
is calculated for the members
depending on various factors. The
amounts of calls vary depending
on the financial performance of the
club.

Premium

Underwriting

Benefit of good underwriting is
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Fixed Premium Providers
Profit making organisation
for the shareholders
Incorporated as commercial
company or stock insurance
company under the relevant
jurisdiction
Share capital with
shareholders
Members are shareholders
and the shares are freely
traded in the market.

The premium is
predetermined depending on
various factors but once it is
fixed there is no more change
depending on the financial
performance of the insurance
company
Benefit of good underwriting

results

passed on to the members in the
form of reduced calls (premium) or
returned calls (premium)

becomes profit for the
shareholders and the insured
has no benefit.

Control
&Management

Shipowners (insurers & insured)
through their elected Board of
Directors
Board of Directors elected by the
shipowners or insured

Shareholders (neither insurers
nor insured unless they are
share holders)
Shipowners have no say and
officers of the company who
have been delegated the
responsibility, process the
claims.
Well defined claims coverage
with no omnibus provision
Normally up to US$500
million
No established or proven
systems except the bank
guarantees which normally
cause considerable delay and
expense.

Decision on
Claims

Coverage of
claims
Limit of cover

Omnibus clause covered

Guarantee or
undertaking
for claims

Normally ‘letters of undertaking
‘issued by the club (IGA) (widely
known & accepted) in case of
arrest or detention by the claimant
to minimize the hardship & loss to
the member

4.7

Up to US$4.25 billion

Major players in the fixed premium insurance market

The major players in the fixed premium segment include British Marine, AXA
Corporate solutions, J.L.Jones, Darag, Dragon P&I, Osprey Underwriting Agency
Limited, Terranova Insurance Company Limited and Southern Seas Agencies Inc
(Andersson, 2001). The major players and the volume of business handled by them
are given below (Lingard, 2001).

Table 12

Fixed Premium Insurers in the Marine Market

Name

AXA Corporate Solutions, Paris
British Marine, Luxembourg
J.L.Jones & Others
Darag, Rostock, Germany

Limit of
Coverage
US $
million
500
500
500
100

Target business

Number
of Vessels

Vessels upto 30000GT
All types of vessels
All types of vessels
Containers
(Upto 2000 TEU)
General Cargo, Ro-Ro,

300
4900
861
826
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Entered
Tonnage
(million
GT)
NA
3.50
9.06
2.01

Premium
income
2000(US$
million)
NA
26.53
23.10
16.00

Dragon P&I, London

500

The Korea Shipowner’s Mutual
Protection &Indemnity
Association, Seoul
Osprey Underwriting agency
Limited, London

500

Raets Insurance Group- Inter
Coastal Ship owners’ P&I BV,
Rotterdam

500

Southern Seas Agencies, Inc,
Brighton, UK

25
&
500
25

25

Terra Nova Insurance Company
Limited, London.
Total
Source: Marsh P&I review, 2000(modified)

Bulk Carriers (upto
20000GT)
General Cargo,
Container, Reefer, Bulk
Carriers and Product
Tankers between 2000 to
30000 GT
South Korean Operation
of all types
Small vessels including
tugs, barges & dry cargo
vessels
Dry Cargo & Tankers
carrying non persistent
cargoes up to 10,000GT
(Excluding USA, Trans
Atlantic or Trans Pacific
Voyages)
All types of vessels
except Tankers and
Passenger vessels.
Domestic, Coastal and
Short Sea trading vessels.

NA

0.42

2.00

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

16.00

500

NA

8.00

200

NA

7.25

3000

NA

NA

10,587

14.99

98.88

The analysis of the volume of business of FPP show that they cover about 10587
vessels with an entered tonnage of about 15 Million GT earning premium revenue
of approximately US$98.88 million (for the period 1999-2000) (HSBC, 2000). In
contrast the P&I mutual clubs cover about 66503 vessels with an entered tonnage
of 558.81 Million GT earning premium (Call income) of 14.94 billion (for the
period 1999-2000). This clearly shows that the volume of business handled by the
FPP’s represents only about 3% of tonnage and 0.6% of the premium revenue
handled by the mutual club insurers (Appendix A & B). Does this mean that the
major players in the FPP do not pose any threat to the business of mutual clubs?
Does this convey that the FPP’s could not make inroads into the share of the
business handled by the mutual clubs? For the time being the answer to these
questions is in affirmative till substantial market share is held by FPP’s.
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4.8 Points for consideration by the shipowner

The shipowners who are members of mutual clubs did not have any alternative till
recently and they have been used to the mutual club culture for more than 100
years and it is difficult for them to get convinced to switch over to any new
arrangement of insurance until they are fully convinced of their benefits and
advantages. The aspects that the shipowner has to look into before taking a
decision to join a mutual or FPP will be (HSBC, 2000.p.1)
1. Financial strength of the insurer including the size of the contingency
reserve of the mutual club if any
2. Supplementary call record of the mutual club versus the certainty of the
fixed premium as well as the level of the general increases if any
3. The breath and depth of the claims service including the network of
correspondents and agents
4. Location of local offices if appropriate
5. If entered in a mutual club the aspect of compatibility with other members
namely does the club have other members from the same country or
region and is it familiar with the owner’s type of operation
6. The size of the club and the implications that this may have on financial
stability and service
7. Personal relationship with members of the insurer’s staff
8. The benefits of insuring other risks with the same insurer
9. The lower limits of cover given by the commercial insurers compared to
the exposure to the overspill calls with the IGA clubs.
The above issues require careful examination before a decision is made by the
shipowner on the type of insurance and insurer that is best suited to his needs. The
target group of the FPP’s are to a large extent different from the mutual clubs. The
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analysis of information in Table 12 show that the FPP’s are clear in their target
market, which will be
1.

Small size vessels which are less than 30000GT

2.

Providing cover mainly to Container vessels, Dry Cargo vessels,
Bulk Carriers and Coastal vessels.

3.

Coverage of liability up to US$500 Million

4.

Avoiding Tankers, Passenger Vessels and vessels trading on the
USA/Trans Atlantic and Trans Pacific routes.

Therefore we can safely conclude that the FPP market has a definite advantage
over the mutual clubs in respect of small vessels, which do not trade in high-risk
areas and therefore require limited coverage of liability.

4.9

Deficiencies and weaknesses of the fixed premium market

As stated above the fixed premium segment targets only a limited portion of the
ocean going vessels avoiding high-risk areas. This clearly shows that the FPP
market is treading cautiously into the marine liability market and they do not
have sufficient expertise or knowledge of this specialized industry to play a
dominant role for the time being. Fredrik Kruse, General Manager of the
Swedish Club (Kruse, 2000) is of the view that in the past the prospects for the
fixed premium P&I were grossly overstated and that the realities are different.
1. There is always a niche market for fixed premium irrespective of what
happens in the wider market
2. Fixed premium tends to enjoy modest growth whenever the market is
weak
3. Fixed premium insurers failed to take significant tonnage from the IG
clubs
4. The factors that restrict the growth of the fixed premium market
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•

Fixed premium providers (FPP) are commercial entities driven by
the need to make profits

•

FPP’s offer somewhat limited cover and tend to lack sophisticated
claims handling infrastructure

•

FPP’s have limited capacity to buy reinsurance

Therefore if the FPP’s are to survive in the marine liability market they should
understand the key issue of long term commitment to shipowners and quality
service at competitive rates.

4.10 Major changes in the mutual club market, which are of significance
to the FPP’s

1. Restructuring effort taken up by the mutual clubs
The mutual clubs felt the need to restructure their activities in response to the
competition from the players outside the clubs and the investigation by the
EC on their alleged anticompetitive practices. The changes came in the form
of
•

Amendment to IGA limiting the total liability cover to US$4.25
Billion as against unlimited coverage

•

To publish the administrative expense ratio of the clubs for the
last five years, which will identify the efficient clubs

•

Certain relaxations in the restriction on movement of tonnage
from one club to another club encourage competition among the
IGA clubs

•

To get interactive ratings from rating agencies on their financial
performance and strength

2. To be more responsive to the needs of the shipowners
Providing one stop shop solution to customers through multi- product services
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•

Providing efficient service by worldwide presence- opening more
offices or appointing correspondents.

•

To minimise the supplementary calls and reduce the percentage
of actual calls to Estimated Total Calls (ETC)

•

To reduce the reinsurance premium by effective negotiation with
the reinsurers

3. To form alliances with major insurance companies in the commercial
market to provide multi product services
4. To appoint professional management companies for the management of
the affairs of the companies

4.11

Failure of Fixed premium insurers in P&I segment

There are only a few fixed premium insurers survived and they are small. They do
not seem to have any apparent advantage other than the certainty that the clients
will not have to pay supplementary calls. Is this an advantage to the shipowner,
BMM the mutual company, which demutualised recently is working on aggressive
expansion strategy. It has merged P&I of Lloyd’s syndicate of Jonathan Jones and
provides H&M cover for small ships (Andersson, 2001). The fixed premium
insurer have not been in a position to make serious inroads into the business of
Mutual clubs since entered tonnage of the mutual clubs have not declined in the
past few years and in fact it has increased. If we look at the table given below the
total tonnage insured by Mutual clubs rose from 471 million dwt in 1997 to 558
million dwt in 2000 (HSBC, 2000.pp.14-50). The Fixed premium insurer can
emerge as real force only if
1. There is high supplementary call charged by mutual clubs
2. High premium increase by mutual clubs
3. Break up of International Group Agreement (IGA)
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CHAPTER 5

5.1 Is there a trend towards demutualisation of mutual insurance companies?
In order to analyse the trends in the mutual market in the maritime industry it is
pertinent to examine the trends in the general insurance industry, which is dominated
by life and property insurers. Mutual insurance companies wrote an estimated 42% of
the global premiums in 1997. Six of the ten largest insurance companies in the world
are mutual insurance companies.
Table 13

Largest insurance companies in the world

Assets in
Form of
US$
ownership
billions
1
AXA
France
407.9
Stock
2
Nippon Life
Japan
323.3
Mutual
3
Allianz
Germany 293.7
Stock
4
Prudential Insurance Company USA
259.5
Mutual
5
Zenkyron
Japan
245.4
Mutual
6
Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Japan
219.6
Mutual
7
Metropolitan Life
USA
201.9
Mutual
8
American International Group
USA
194.4
Stock
9
Sumitomo Life
Japan
181.6
Mutual
10
Prudential
UK
178.9
Stock
Source: Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting, 1999(Sigma, 1999.p.5)
Rank

Company

Country

This shows that the mutual insurance companies are a big force in the general
insurance industry. If we look at the country wise analysis of the premiums written by
the mutual insurers the mutuals command the largest share in Japan (more than
75%)followed by USA (about 35%), UK, Germany and France (averaging about
25%). The above data show that mutual insurers are dominant in Japan and USA
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compared to Europe. Is there a trend towards demutualisation in the general insurance
industry? The analysis of the data in the last 10 years shows a different picture.

Table 14

Market share of mutual insurers in major insurance markets (in
Percentage)

Country

Property insurance

Life insurance

1987

1997

1987

1997

USA

31

33

40

35

Japan

4

3

93

89

UK

14

8

46

33

Germany

19

16

31

26

France

40

37

10

5

Aggregate

24

24

57

52

Source: Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting, 1999 (Sigma,1999.p.18)

The overall market shares of the mutual insurers remain more or less stable in the
property and life segment except for some regional variations. There is a perceptible
decline in the share of the mutual insurers in the UK, Germany and France compared
to USA and Japan.

5.2 What are the circumstances that influence the demutualiation of mutual
insurance companies?

The research report (Sigma, 1999) indicates that the mutual insurers are under
pressure to go in for demutualisation due to competition and consolidation that are
evidenced in the general insurance industry. Over the past few decades consumer
demand for insurance services has shifted from the traditional insurance policy cover
to new financial products. The mutual insurers can remain mutual as long as they stay
competitive. They can convert to stock ownership companies, which provides them
the benefit of the opportunity to grow with access to capital but it has risks too. The
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risk is that the stock ownership companies are susceptible to take over from other big
players in the market.

5.3

How the mutual insurance companies respond to the competition from

other players specially the stock insurance companies?

We have discussed in the earlier chapters the response of the mutual insurers to the
competition by providing one-stop-shop solutions, reductions in supplementary calls,
trying to offer the certainty of premium, reductions in administrative cost and looking
for mergers and alliances. Some clubs have done away with the word ‘call’ and they
replaced it with the word ‘premium’ like the fixed premium market. A new spirit of
competition has taken root among the clubs consequent to the investigation by the EC
and their conditional extension of the antitrust law exemption for the IGA. This has
contributed to new competitive pressures and the obvious signs of this competition
are a sudden interest in the total package, that is to say the one-stop-shop solution,
merger discussions, more emphasis on financial strength and the launch of new
products. (Kruse, 2000) The mutual insurers respond to the competition from the
stock insurance companies by providing high quality value added service and
efficient financial management resulting in control of supplementary calls. The
strength of the mutual insurers is in the service. Most shipowners seek quality service
and they naturally gravitate towards those clubs with good financial strength and a
track record of zero supplementary calls. The clubs differ from each other in financial
strength, membership profile and claims experience. The focus of the mutual clubs in
the competitive environment could be (Malmros, 2000)
1. Financial certainty-Zero supplementary call
2. P&I cover up to US$4.25 billion (with no premium cost for risk transfer in the
US$5-30 million band)
3. Quality of service
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4. One-stop-shop service (a single service provider will cover H&M, P&I, FD&D,
Loss of Hire and war risks)
5. Proactive loss prevention support
6. Fair and competitive premium
There is a pressure on the clubs to reduce the administrative costs consequent to the
decision of the EC instructing the clubs to divulge their average expense ratios. One
way of achieving the reduction in administrative costs could be mergers of clubs,
which would minimise the overheads. The implication of competition from the
commercial providers is that many small clubs may merge resulting in a number of
large clubs or some of the small clubs may get demutualised (Malmros, 2000). This
would lead us to the next question as to what would be the optimum size for a P&I
club? The view of Peter Crichton of the North of England P&I Association is that it
would be 30 million tonnes (Crichton, 2000).

5.4 What are the critical factors that would tell us whether the mutual insurer is
likely to demutualise?

Research carried out on the demutualisation process in the general insurance industry
focusing on the demutualisation of life insurance companies offers an interesting
perspective. Even though the above study focused on the mutual life insurers, the
basic concept and purpose of mutual insurers remain the same in any segment of the
insurance industry. The practical implications of the conversion of the organisational
structure from mutual to joint stock company is influenced by various critical factors
(Carson, 1998.p.2). They are,
1.

Free cash flow

2.

Access to capital

3.

Wealth expropriation at the time of conversion

4.

Expense preference behaviour

5.

Loss ratios
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The relationship of the variables mentioned above to the probability of
demutualisation gave the following findings (Carson, 1998.p.6).
The probability of demutualisation is
1. Positively related to the level of free cash flow
2. Positively related to the level of surplus from the members’ point of view for
expropriation
3. Negatively related to the level of surplus which relates to access to capital
from the capital market
4. Negatively related to the size of the insurer
5. Positively related to the level of management expenses from the mutual
insurer point of view
6. Positively related to the losses (Loss ratio)
Let us analyse the above factors and see how they are linked to the mutual insurance
industry

5.5

Factors which influence demutualisation of mutual clubs in

maritime

industry

Let us now try to apply the above findings to mutual P&I clubs and identify whether
they are susceptible to demutualisation or not. In the case of mutual insurers I
propose to consider the following as the factors that would influence demutualisation.
The relationship between these independent variables and their effect on
demutualisation will be analysed qualitatively to find whether a mutual club would
have a tendency to demutualise. The data utilised for this study are the financial data
pertaining to the mutual clubs who are members of the IGA and the data are gathered
from various published sources and compiled in a format, which would facilitate
analysis. The following factors are assumed to influence demutualisation.
1. Cash flow
• Supplementary call percentage
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•

Cost of premium as percentage of ETC

•

Release call percentage

2. Free reserves/Surplus
•

Total free reserves per GT of entered tonnage

•

Free reserves as percentage of call income

•

Ratio of free reserves to net outstanding claims

•

Ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims outstanding

3. Access to capital
4. Size of the insurer
5. Management and administrative expenses i.e. AER
6. Losses
7. Rate of return on investment income
8. Ratings from specialised rating agency

5.5.1

Cashflow

The free cashflow is the residual that exists after the company has invested in all
beneficial projects (Jensen, 1986. pp.323-339). Studies indicate that the mutual
insurers have higher free cash flow compared to stock insurance companies and
therefore the agency costs associated with the free cash flow is higher for the mutuals
than the stock insurers. (Mayers & Smith, 1981)(Wells, 1995). The greater the level
of cash flow the higher the likelihood of demutualisation in order to control the
agency costs of equity. In the case of a mutual insurer also the level of free cash flow
is an important factor, which determines the capacity of the insurer in prompt
settlement of claims.
5.5.1.1

Supplementary call

The cash flow of a mutual insurer is directly dependent on the amount of call income
and investment income. The members of a club normally contribute to the calls on
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the basis of an estimate arrived at by the club keeping in view their investment
income, estimated claims and administrative expenses. The members in one year are
responsible collectively for the claims arising in that year and they contribute to the
supplementary call if deficits and free reserve requirements require excess
supplementary call.
Table 15 Excess Supplementary call /overspill claims
(including the recharged cost of group excess reinsurance programme)
P&I CLUBS
Gard
Shipowners
Britannia
Standard
UK Club
London Club
North of England
Swedish Club
West of England
Steamship
Skuld
American Club

2001
5%
5%
5.50%
5.50%
7%
9.50%
11%
11%
11.25%
13.50%
13.50%
13.50%

Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services

A higher supplementary call indicates either a greater deficit or a desire to increase
free reserve requirements. Clubs tend to look for ways and means to reduce their
supplementary call since members may not like to have unbudgeted supplementary
calls. The clubs may look for Alternative Risk Transfer products (ART) to stabilise
additional supplementary calls through alliances with major reinsurers as in the case
of the UK Club and Steamship, which worked out alliances with Swiss Re and ERCFrankona. Under this new arrangement the members of these clubs in a particular
year of account will no longer be collectively accountable for their own claims, the
deficit will be recovered under the finite amount of calls and future year members
have to pay the cost through incremental reinsurance premium in the later years.
Therefore the clubs that have higher supplementary calls of more than 10% namely
the American, the Skuld, the steamship, the West of England, the Swedish and the
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North of England clubs may tend to go in for alliances with big reinsurance
companies to provide finite calls to their members through ART. Is this arrangement
in tune with the concept of mutuality? The Elysian P&I review report (2000)
observes that the concept of mutuality undergoes a change under the new
arrangement wherein the existing members may pay a finite call and new members in
the coming years may pay additional amounts of reinsurance premium consequent to
deficits in the earlier years. The basic tenet of mutuality gets altered in case the
members are allowed to switch clubs they may choose the best alternative to avoid an
increase in the premium.
5.5.1.2

Cost of coverage as a percentage of ETC

Table16

Cost of cover as Percentage of Estimated Total Call (ETC)
(25 year average since 1976) in percentage.
Name of the club
Britannia
The Shipowners
Japan
Gard
The UK
Steamship Mutual
American
Skuld
The North of England
The Standard
The West of England
The Swedish
The London

ETC
79.9
87.3
91.7
95.2
101
102.2
106.2
108.6
109.4
109.8
117
117.8
124.6

Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services

Similarly many clubs are charging larger premia higher than ETC .The cost of
coverage as a percentage of ETC for 25 years since 1976 in Table 16 shows greater
control on calls exercised by Britannia (80%), Shipowners (87%), Japan (92%) and
Gard (95%) in comparison to the London (125%), Swedish (125%) and West of
England (117%) clubs. The clubs that have higher cost of coverage tend to look for
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ways to minimise the cost through the ART mechanism by establishing alliances with
big insurance companies or demutualise to work out permanent arrangements with
big players in the insurance market who offer ART.

5.5.1.3

Release calls
Table 17

Release calls of Clubs (2000)

Name of the club
Japan
The Shipowners Club
The UK Club
The Standard Club
Steamship Mutual
The London Club
American Club
Britannia Club
Gard
The North of England
The Swedish Club
The West of England
Skuld

Release calls
5%
5%
5%
15%
15%
20%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
30%

Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services

If we look at the release calls percentage in Table 17, the clubs that have higher
release calls display their vulnerability since they expect claims in excess of the
budgeted calls. The clubs want to protect it’s recovery of claim from departing
members through release calls which shows that clubs are expecting to charge their
members additional calls as reflected in the release call. However, such release calls
lose their relevance if the clubs go in for ART since ART eliminates the prospect of
excess calls to existing members and only future members will feel the impact. Most
of the clubs have higher release calls of more than 15% and even 30% as in the case
Skuld.
The clubs that show a nominal release call of 5% are the Japan Club, Shipowners
Club and UK Club. The higher release calls also indicate either the expected
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additional future claims or a fear of losing their existing members. The clubs that
have higher release calls may tend to look for programme for reducing their future
claims through ART or look for alliances or mergers with other clubs in order to
maintain their market share. The clubs that have higher release calls are also
susceptible to takeover and they may demutualise to provide finite cover.

5.5.2

Free reserves

The demutualisation involves a transfer of wealth to the stakeholders of mutual
insurers. The amount of expropriation of wealth is directly related to the free cash
flow and reserves. The higher the relative levels of cash flow and reserves are, the
more likely it is that they would motivate the demutulisation since the members of
mutual insurers gain more by expropriation. In the mutual insurance industry the
relative levels of free reserves, after taking into account the outstanding claims and
other liabilities, would represent the net assets of the mutual club, which are
potentially available for expropriation if the mutual club is demutualised. If we look
at the case of demutualisation of a leading marine mutual company BMM in 1999,
BMM had as membership 1700 shipowners with 6500 ships at the time of
demutualisation. BMM had reserves to the tune of US$41 million and annual income
of US$69 million and it distributed around US$ 30 million to its members. This
worked out to a sum of approximately US$4600 per ship for each member (Beatty,
1999). The members of a mutual with large reserves and surpluses would be
motivated by larger personal gains if they were to demutualise. The free reserves
consist of assets extending beyond the specific provisions made for claims. Free
reserves are held in trust by clubs for members and represent the members’ protection
in depth. Free reserves protect members against any fluctuation in club results. The
clubs that have strong reserves could be regarded as clubs with good financial
strength, i.e. the Shipowners Club, London Club and Standard Club. Therefore the
free reserves could form the basis for ascertaining the strength of the clubs by
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working out ratios in relation to entered tonnage of the club, call income, outstanding
losses and net outstanding claims.

5.5.2.1.

Free reserves per owners GT entered in the clubs

The ratio of free reserves to entered tonnage may be considered as a yardstick to
assess and compare the financial strength of the clubs. This ratio is similar to the
member’s equity per Gross tonne of ship (GT) in the club on a break up basis with no
provision for winding down costs.
Table 18

Total free reserves per owners’ GT entered in the clubs (in US $)

Percentage increase
Name of the club
2000
1999
1998
1997
in 2001 to 1997
4.23
5.61
6.62
5.02
-16
American
1.85
2.18
2.68
2.92
-37
Britannia
4.55
4.89
5.07
4.14
+10
Gard
1.05
1.04
1.00
0.97
+8
Japan
5.89
5.34
5.02
3.82
+54
The London
3.38
4.01
3.14
2.71
+24
The North of England
11.21
10.91
9.87
8.02
+40
The Shipowners
2.46
2.65
2.67
2.98
-17
Skuld
5.71
5.90
7.06
8.14
-29
The Standard
2.34
2.35
2.32
1.84
+27
Steamship Mutual
NA*
NA
NA
NA
NA
The Swedish
4.17
4.75
4.11
3.91
+7
The UK
4.34
4.35
3.80
2.40
+81
The West of England
*Swedish does not publish break up figures for hull and P&I insurance.
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services.

From the above it may be seen that the clubs which have higher reserves per GT,
namely the Ship owners Club, the London Club and the Standard Club as well as the
clubs which are showing consistent increases in the free reserves namely the West of
England Club, the London Club and the Ship Owners Club are expected to have good
financial strength and by virtue of the high proportion of free reserves and consistent
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increase in their reserves, they demonstrate more propensity to demutualise than the
other clubs.

5.5.2.2.

Free reserves as a percentage of call income

The Table 19 provides information on the strength of the clubs with reference to their
call income. A high percentage of reserves to call income indicate the strong reserve
position of the clubs, which are not directly dependent on an increase in the call
income. However, a rising percentage could be due to either increased free reserves
or falling premium or a combination of both. This ratio is similar to the conventional
premium / surplus ratio. The clubs that have a relatively higher ratio are the London
Club, the Standard Club, the Gard Club and the UK Club demonstrate that they have
strong reserves and, therefore, they are more susceptible to demutualisation in
comparison to other clubs. The reserve to call income of the Britannia Club has fallen
by 13.1 % showing the erosion of its reserves.
Table 19

Free reserves as a percentage of call income

2000
1999
1998
Name of the club
97.77
102.33 83.41
American Club
91.41
99.69
110.40
Britannia Club
175.56
184.23 176.74
Gard
43.84
36.33
36.15
Japan
230.11
210.35
155.25
The London Club
115.03
96.98
74.01
The North of England
119.07
107.83
86.32
The Shipowners Club
73.27
67.88
70.39
Skuld
209.03
223.66 230.97
The Standard Club
55.60
46.95
44.32
Steamship Mutual
146.30
142.05 105.15
The Swedish Club
160.45
158.82 133.22
The UK Club
126.70
119.83 94.07
The West of England
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services
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1997
70.55
105.22
130.39
32.82
94.00
59.61
67.60
54.33
209.83
31.37
77.68
104.69
55.42

% Increase in 2001 to
1997
38.5
-13.1
34.6
33.5
144.7
93.0
76.1
34.9
0
77.2
84.8
53.2
128.6

5.5.2.3 Ratio of free reserves to net outstanding claims
Table 20

Ratio of free reserves to net outstanding claims

2000
1999
1998
Name of the club
43.93
51.46
45.52
American Club
26.09
29.86
50.82
Britannia Club
55.66
63.84
70.30
Gard
34.85
34.35
33.30
Japan
48.31
43.93
42.01
The London Club
36.07
31.22
35.82
The North of E
32.49
79.57
36.50
Skuld
87.15
67.63
71.61
Shipowners
65.11
64.99
74.51
The Standard Club
20.99
19.97
20.27
Steamship Mutual
77.88
77.16
78.30
The Swedish Club
47.98
52.04
43.16
The UK Club
39.25
39.21
34.29
The West of England
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services

% Increase in 2001 to
1998
- 0.04
-48.66
-49.27
04.65
15.00
06.97
-10.98
21.70
-12.61
03.55
- 05.36
11.16
14.46

This ratio shows the tolerance within the club for adverse claims development. How
much reserve is available to meet adverse claims as a percentage of the net exposure
in the balance sheet? How far can the free reserves be utilised to meet additional
claims? This scenario may not arise since the clubs would normally go in for
supplementary calls or ATR or other reinsurance arrangements. The clubs that show
the highest ratios of more than 50% i.e. the Shipowners Club, the Swedish Club, the
Standard Club and the Gard Club have adequate reserves since a large proportion of
their reserves could be utilized for meeting outstanding losses and in contrast, the
clubs that have weak and inadequate reserves are Britannia, Steamship and Skuld.
The clubs that have higher ratios may have propensity to demutualise since the
members would be motivated by large personal gains consequent to demutualisation.

5.5.2.4

Ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims outstanding

The ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims outstanding indicates the reinsurance
leverage of the club i.e. How much of the club’s gross claims liability is dependent
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Table 21 Ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims outstanding
Name of the club
American Club
Britannia Club
Gard
Japan
The London Club
The North of E
Skuld
The Shipowners Club
The Standard Club
Steamship Mutual
The Swedish Club
The UK Club
The West of England

2000

1999

1998

17.75
20.42
13.75
05.35
14.59
28.04
27.72
37.94
16.47
27.03
31.87
10.06
16.56

12.18
11.10
15.76
08.39
15.42
26.02
26.40
38.24
17.62
23.06
24.68
13.93
16.85

15.47
09.68
13.32
20.76
13.23
25.96
24.99
27.88
21.07
23.11
28.37
15.00
18.42

% Increase in 2001 to
1998
14.73
110.95
03.22
-74.22
10.27
08.01
10.92
36.08
-21.83
16.96
12.34
-32.93
-10.10

Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services

upon the strength of reinsurance arrangements and how much relies on it’s own balance
sheet. The clubs that show a higher ratio of 25% or more i.e. the Shipowners, the
Swedish, the North of England, the Skuld and the Steamship Mutual clubs have weak
leverage or weak reinsurance arrangements compared to the clubs such as the Japan, the
UK and the Gard clubs that have lower ratios. Similarly the clubs that have a higher
increase of ratios since 1998 namely the Britannia Club and the Shipowners’ Club show
the declining leverage on reinsurance arrangements in comparison to the Japan and UK
clubs who have improved their ratios since 1998.The clubs that have higher ratios which
means weak reinsurance are likely to be more vulnerable to structural changes to
improve their leverage than other clubs.

5.5.3.

Access to Capital

The mutual insurer may convert to joint stock Company for the purpose of gaining
access to capital markets which would be required to fund projects. If the mutual insurer
has a high free cash flow and has no profitable project to spend it on then it would
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suggest that it would not go in for demutualisation to fund projects. (Wells,1995). The
lower the relative levels of surplus the higher the probability of demutualisation to gain
access to capital markets. In the case of marine insurance mutuals the demutualisation of
BMM appears to have been prompted by their desire to increase their capital and expand
their activities since they were a well-run club with no call crisis and good tonnage at the
time of demutualisation. Richard Leslie, the General Manager of BMM mentioned that
the demutualisation of BMM would increase the market share and offer more products
to the shipowners apart from enhancing the solvency of the company. In this deal, the
newly formed stock company British Marine Holdings received additional capital to the
tune of US$35 million from an investment company Capital Z Financial Services Fund
II L.P. This investment company is a US$1.85 billion global private equity fund focused
on the insurance, financial services and health care services industries (Beatty, 1999).
Therefore, the demutualisation of a well-run mutual club could also be prompted by
their desire to access capital and increase their market share. The clubs that have the
lowest reserves namely the Japan , the Britannia the Steamship Mutual and the Skuld
clubs have higher propensity to demutualise in order to access capital and finance their
expansion plans.

5.5.4 Size of the insurer

The steps in the demutualisation process include obtaining approval for conversion from
a majority of the directors, insurance regulatory authorities and the majority (normally
two thirds) of voting members. (Garber, 1986) (Hemmings, 1995). In addition, other
approvals are required under the relevant legislation from the tax authorities and labour
departments. The larger the mutual insurer the more cumbersome
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Table 22

Size of the club (based on entered tonnage (Million GT)
Market
Club
2000 Share %
The UK Club
90.3 15.98
Gard
89.8 15.89
Britannia Club
79.0 13.98
Steamship Mutual
64.1 11.35
Japan
48.0 08.50
The Standard Club
42.0 07.44
Skuld
39.6 07.00
The West of England
37.0 06.55
The London Club
25.8 04.57
The North of England
21.3 03.77
The Swedish Club
13.7 02.42
The Shipowners Club
08.2 01.45
American Club
06.2 01.10
Total
565 100
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services

the process of demutualisation, and, therefore, the larger mutuals are less likely to
undergo a demutualisation process. The above aspect is relevant to mutual marine
insurers if the membership is quite large and the pattern of distribution of members
country wise shows that the members of a particular club are spread out all over the
world. However, this aspect may not be decisive since some mutual clubs are more
regionally oriented with membership concentrated from particular regions and relatively
few owner members hold a voting majority in the club. In any case, the above aspect is
one of the important factors for consideration at the time of demutualisation. The larger
clubs who have more than 10% market share such as the UK, the Gard, the Britannia
and the Steamship Mutual clubs may look for opportunities to merger with small clubs
such as the American Club or the Swedish Club in order to increase their market share.
The much talked about merger of the Standard and the Britannia did not materialise last
year but such mergers are expected in future.
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5.5.5

Management and administrative expenses

Table 23

Average Expense Ratio (5Years on 2000)
Name of the Club
Japan
The London Club
Britannia Club
Gard
The North of England
The Standard Club
The UK Club
The Swedish Club
American Club
The West of England
Steamship Mutual
Skuld
The Shipowners Club

5 year AER
5.68
5.8
7.31
7.4
7.7
7.9
8.12
8.26
8.4
8.52
8.7
9
16

Source: Elysian Insurance Services

There were some studies conducted in 1980’s which indicate that the mutual
organisations have higher administrative and management expenses than stock
companies (Frech, 1980, O’Hara, 1981). The above research is old and the managers
may have learnt from them or changed behaviour but managers of mutual
organizations cannot share the benefits of the ownership, such as stock options or
bonuses linked to the profit which gives rise to expenses preference behaviour in the
form of consumption of more perquisites and agency costs. (Verbruggae & Goldstein,
1981). Until recently the mutual marine insurers who are members of the IGA were
not obliged to disclose their administrative expenses and When the issue of
exemption from competition legislation came up for approval before the European
Commission, the Commission found this to be anti competitive and instructed the
members of the IGA to disclose their 5 year Average Expense Ratio (AER). The
result of this exercise was that many clubs with higher administrative cost were
forced to find ways and means of cutting the cost including mergers and alliances.
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The clubs can compete effectively within the IGA as long as they have a better AER.
Therefore, the average expense ratio of a mutual club is one of the indicators for
demutualisation.
The publication of AER was as a result of the negotiation with the EC when it
agreed to the new exemption in 1999.The following factors may distort AER (Elysian
P&I review, 2000)
1. Size of the vessel
2. High level of deductible agreed by owners and consequent low premium
3. Clubs with more regional offices may offer better service to their members with
more expense
4. Clubs with good record able to reduce it’s calls to it’s members can produce the
same AER as a club with a poor record and which has a high premium level.
In general, higher AER ratios as in the case of the shipowners, the Skuld, the
Steamship Mutual, the West of England and the UK clubs (above 8%) indicate that
the clubs are incurring higher administrative costs, which might drain their reserves
or may result in enhanced call premium, are susceptible to merger or takeover in
order to bring down their administrative cost.
5.5.6

Losses

The mutual insurer may have higher losses due to various reasons including poor
underwriting or under pricing its services. Sustained high loss ratios would reduce the
reserves, which will affect the growth prospects and solvency of a mutual insurance
company. This may also trigger the need to go in for additional capital but access to
capital could be possible only through demutualisation. Therefore, a higher loss ratio
is associated with a higher probability of demutualisation. Most of the clubs have
underwriting losses for the past five years due to a fall in rates of premium and
increase in claims. The clubs faced competition from fixed premium providers as
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well as hull insurers who entered the P&I market to cover up the losses in Hull
market. In the year 2000 only two clubs generated an underwriting profit, i.e. the
Standard and the Steamship clubs. The remaining clubs continue to sustain losses,
many for at least the fifth consecutive year. The clubs that have high underwriting
losses have limited options to minimize losses except going in for increases in calls or
utilising the reserves or cutting costs. In a competitive market it will be difficult to
increase the calls and, therefore, the clubs, which have been sustaining losses for the
past 5 years, may tend to merge or form alliances or demutualise in order to survive
in the market.
Table 24

Underwriting result of IGA (in US$ ´000)

Name of the club
American Club
Britannia Club

1999-2000
(12 months)
-9707
-21396

1998-99
(12 months)
-4923
-29492

1997-98
(12 months)
-4011
-11602

1996-97
(36 months)
-13
421

Gard
Japan
The London Club
The North of England

-2124
NA
-21600
-10520

7579
NA
-29900
-5572

15462
NA
-30900
-6156

31352
NA
NA
-5277

The Shipowners Club
Skuld
The Standard Club
Steamship Mutual

-4468
-13500
5281
691

-3622
-3400
1742
25112

NA
4100
6477
23755

2200
360
1023
14590

NA
-88735
534

NA
-86770
1786

NA
NA
The Swedish Club
-109225
-81631
The UK Club
-5673
476
The West of England
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services

5.5.7 Investment Income

The investment income forms an important component of income of mutual clubs
and the determination of estimated call income depends on the amount of investment
income the club is expected to earn in a particular year. The investments of clubs are
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spread in fixed assets, equities and other investments. Nowadays most of the clubs
engage professional investment advisors for investments and some clubs

Table 25 Percentage of investment Income for the period 1999-2000

Name of the Club
The North of England
Japan
The West of England
Britannia Club
American Club
Skuld
The Standard Club
The London Club
The Swedish Club
The UK Club
Gard
Steamship Mutual
The Shipowners Club

Percentage of investment income
0.52
1.64
3.18
4.66
5.60
5.68
5.99
6.30
6.52
6.84
7.10
9.05
9.50

Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services

achieved high returns from large holdings of equities wherein the risk is higher. The
clubs that have large reserves have large amounts of capital to invest such as the
Britannia Club, which over the years established a very substantial balance and
achieved considerable investment returns. The clubs that have a higher proportion of
investment income as a percentage of total funds, such as the Shipowners, the
Steamship Mutual and the Gard clubs, were able to minimise their call income
requirement from members and they have an advantage over the clubs, which have a
lower percentage, such as North of England and Japan. The clubs that have a lower
proportion of investment income of less than 4% namely the North of England, the
Japan and the West of England clubs may have propensity to demutualise or undergo
other forms structural changes such as mergers or alliances in order to increase their
investment income which would improve their bottomline.
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5.5.8 Ratings given by specialized rating agency

Table 26

Ratings from Standard & Poor’s

Name of the club
American Club
Britannia Club
Gard
Japan
The London Club
The North of England
The Shipowners Club
Skuld
The Standard Club
Steamship Mutual
The Swedish Club
The UK Club
The West of England

96-97
BBB
A
A
BB
BBB
BBB
A
BBB
A
BBB
BBB
A
BBB

97-98
BBB
A
A
BB
A
BBB
A
BBB
A
BBB
BBB
A
BBB

98-99
BBB
A
A
BB
A
BBB
A
BBB
AABBB
BBB
A
BBB

99-00
BBB+*
A
A
BB
A
A-*
A
BB
AA-*
BBB
BBB
AA-*
BBB

*These clubs have obtained interactive ratings from S&P

Source: Modified data from Marsh P&I review, 2000 and HSBC P&I review, 2000

The ratings given by rating agencies reflect the financial strength of the clubs. The
ratings also give an indication as to whether the clubs will be in a position to survive the
competition within the IGA as well as from commercial insurers. The ratings also
provide information to shipowners as an aid to decide on the reliability of the insurer and
the mutual clubs that have higher ratings are in a better position to increase their market
share than the ones with poor ratings. Therefore, the clubs that have poor ratings are
susceptible to takeover or merger with other clubs who have better ratings. Furthermore,
the clubs with better ratings may tend to demutualise in order to increase their market
share and diversify their business into non-P&I and even non-marine insurance business.
The Standard and Poor ratings predicted the vulnerability of the Ocean Marine Club,
which became insolvent as well as the New castle, the Liverpool and London clubs,
which were taken over. The clubs that have marginal ratings of BB or lower, i.e. the
Skuld and the Japan clubs may look for alliances or mergers if their ratings are further
downgraded in future.

69

5.6

Summary of analysis and result

In summary the relationship of various factors, which determine the changes in the
structure and operation of the club is given below. The general term ‘structural
change’ is used since the club may choose to go in for any of the structural changes
like mergers, alliances or demutualisation in order to survive and stabilize their
business activity. To arrive at conclusions as to which clubs are likely to undergo
structural change, certain assumptions on the benchmarking of figures were applied.
These assumptions were based on discussion with certain insurance clubs and
information gathered from various P&I review reports For example, only
supplementary calls of above 12% were considered to influence structural changes and
the rest of the clubs were not considered for that factor.
1. Cashflow
•

The higher the supplementary calls the stronger the tendency
towards structural changes. The supplementary calls of above
12% are considered to influence the structural changes.

•

The higher the cost of premium as percentage of ETC the greater
is the chance of structural changes. The percentage of cost of
premium on ETC of above 110 is considered to influence
structural changes.

•

The lesser the release calls the weaker the inclination towards
structural changes. The release calls of above 25% are considered
to influence the structural changes

2. Free reserves
•

The higher the free reserves the stronger the tendency towards
structural changes

•

Reserves per GT of more than US$4 are expected to influence
structural changes
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•

Free reserves as a percentage of call income of more than 150%
are expected to influence structural changes.

•

A ratio of free reserves to net outstanding claims of more than 50
is considered to influence structural changes.

•

A ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims of more than 25 is
considered to influence structural changes.

3. Access to capital
•

A need to access capital arises when the club has low reserves.
The lower the reserves of a mutual club the higher the chances of
demutualisation to bring in financial stability and expand their
business

4. Size of the club
•

An entered tonnage of more than 50 million GT (say about 10 %
of total tonnage of P&I clubs) is considered to influence structural
changes in the club.

5. Management and administrative expenses
•

An Average Expense Ratio (AER) of 8% or more is considered to
influence structural changes in the club.

6. Underwriting losses
•

Even though higher underwriting losses may trigger the clubs to
go in for structural changes, there is no significant trend was
observed in the data relating to the underwriting losses of various
clubs since many clubs were incurring losses for more than 5
years.

7. Rate of return on investment
•

A rate of return on investments of 4% or less is considered to
influence structural changes in the club.
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8. Rating given by specialised rating agencies.
•

A lower rating of BB or below given by the specialized rating
agency Standard & Poor is considered to influence structural
changes in the club.

Based on the above parameters the clubs that were short-listed are given below. The
clubs that had the greatest number of factors are considered to be strong candidates for
structural changes. The clubs are grouped based on the number of points obtained by
them. A Summary of the analysis is given in Appendix:A.
Group 1: very strong tendency towards structural change - Clubs that had total
points in the range of 9-12
Group 2: strong tendency towards structural change - Clubs that had total points
in the range of 5 - 8
Group 3: Clubs that have a weak tendency towards structural change - Clubs
that had total points in the range of 1-4.
Based on the analysis presented in the above table the clubs are grouped as under
Group 1 - None
Group 2 - Skuld, Gard, Steamship, Swedish and West of England
Group 3 – American, Britannia, Japan, London, North of England, Ship Owner,
Standard and UK
From the above it may be inferred that the Skuld, the Japan, the Gard, the Swedish,
the Steamship mutual and the West of England have a strong tendency towards
structural change, which may be merger, alliance or demutualisation. The clubs
that showed the weak tendency towards structural change are the American, the
Britannia, the London, the Japan, the North of England, the Shipowner, the
Standard and The UK clubs. Even though all the clubs are grouped into two
categories if we look at the critical factors and deviation from cut off limit, the
clubs Skuld and Steamship have strong tendency to demutualise than other clubs
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in Group 2. Similarly in Group 3, the clubs Japan and London have weak tendency
towards demutusalisation. In respect of other clubs they are favourably positioned
to undergo structural changes in the coming years. One interesting observation is
that out of the thirteen clubs five clubs have shown a strong tendency in varying
degrees, which explains changes that are happening in the mutual marine industry.
The present dominance of the mutual clubs will continue for some time and their
survival is enhanced by the consolidation effort that has been taking place among
the mutual clubs. This might result in the emergence of certain super clubs who
are efficient and strong and they may decide to demutualise if the circumstances
warrant that they need to grow big and access funds from the capital market.
Similarly the emergence of some FPP’s as big players in the P&I segment is not
ruled out notwithstanding the fact that this segment is dominated by the mutual
clubs.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1

Challenges faced by marine mutuals

There are an ever-increasing number of changes happening in the general
insurance industry, which poses challenges to the marine insurance industry.
The mutual marine industry which controls about 80% of P&I insurance stood
united when they faced the challenge from the European Commission (EC)
investigating their anti competitive practices. The approval given by the EC to
the International Group Agreement (IGA) for another ten years up to 2009 was
a big relief to all mutual insurers. However, one should not forget that the
approval was given with a rider that there should be fair competition among the
clubs who form part of the IGA and transparency in their operation. Whether
such competition among IGA members will pose a challenge to the survival of
the IGA is a big question? The benefits, which clubs used to derive from being
members of the IGA are diminishing or becoming insignificant, especially with
the emergence of Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) products. The other aspect,
which poses a challenge to the IGA is the emergence of a trend of consolidation
among mutual clubs, i.e. mergers, acquisitions, alliances and demutualisation.
Such a trend witnessed in the last few years, has contributed to the demise of
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two clubs, the New castle Club and the Liverpool & London Club, which
merged with the North of England Club. Similar mergers are not ruled out in
future and this may result in the development of a few big clubs, which would
compete with each other and control a major share of the marine insurance
market. What is going to be the role of the IGA in such a scenario? It may be
insignificant since the big clubs would be in a position to bargain for better
reinsurance premia and provide higher limits of cover than those currently
available to the IGA.

6.2

Changes in the marine insurance industry

The mutual insurance industry has faced competition from fixed premium
insurers, which triggered certain important changes in the mutual marine
industry, inter alia ( Mitchell, 2001)
•

Decline in the rates of insurance premia

•

Reduction in management and administrative expenses i.e. Average
Expense Ratio (AER)

•

Reduction in supplementary calls

•

Improvement in quality of service of mutual clubs

•

Provision of one- stop-shop services to meet the changing needs of
shipowners

•

Demutualisation of some mutual clubs

•

Alliances and mergers of some mutual clubs with big players in the
insurance sector.

6.3

Why Fixed premium providers failed in their effort?

The above changes were swiftly adopted by the mutual marine industry meet

75

the new competition from the fixed premium providers. The fact of the matter
is that the Fixed Premium providers (FPP) could not make inroads into the
mutual marine industry and are now confined to small ship segment with
limited amount of cover up to US$ 500 million in contrast to US$ 4.25 billion
offered by IGA clubs. Perhaps the blessing in disguise is the changes that the
FPP’s have brought in to the mutual industry.
The failure of FPP’s could be attributed to the following reasons
1. Timing of their entry into market, i.e. when the insurance business
cycle is at it’s downward cycle
2. Quick and united response from mutual insurers in making
structural changes to counter the advantage of FPP
•

Consolidation among mutual clubs

•

Introduction of certainty of premium – fixed calls in
contrast to unbudgeted calls

•

No supplementary calls

•

Adoption of ART products to provide finite calls

•

Cut in insurance premium and reduction in reinsurance cost

In retrospect the failure of FPP is only a temporary phenomenon and a second
assault when the insurance market cycle in it’s upward trend is not ruled out.
They may be successful in their second attempt if mutual clubs are slack in
keeping pace with the changes that are taking place in the commercial
insurance market.

6.4

Is the concept of mutuality relevant in marine insurance today?

The system of mutuality relied on stakeholders’ culture, pooling of risk,
cohesion and benevolent monopoly. Nowadays, the needs of shipowners are
changing very fast due to the sophistication of delivery systems for insurance
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products. In contrast to the personal one to one approach of brokers with
underwriters shipowners nowadays have direct access to information on
availability of insurance coverage and terms and conditions from all over the
world and decide on the insurer who is best suited to the interest of the
particular shipowner. The technological development, therefore, constitutes a
direct attack on the relationship of insurance, which continues to be at the heart
of most marine mutual insurers. The cohesion and benevolent monopoly also
suffer due to competition. The individual shipowners who are aware of the
alternatives may refuse to cross-subsidise other members of the mutual clubs
who contribute less to the bottom line. Therefore, the long-term survival of the
mutual concept is unlikely unless the mutual insurers come out with some
innovative mechanism to meet the changing needs of the shipowners in a
technologically highly sophisticated environment.

6.5

Is demutualisation a viable option to mutual clubs?

Studies seem to point towards demutualisation as one of the most important
options. The worldwide insurance industry was dominated by mutuals a decade
back. Since then there has been a trend towards their demutualisation, which
saw many mutual insurance companies in the life insurance sector
demutualising. Even though Swiss Re in it’s latest report (Sigma, 1999)
observed that mutual insurers have some fundamental advantages over the joint
stock companies and should reconsider the decision of rushing to demutualise,
the trend towards demutualisation is clear. The fundamental advantage that a
mutual insurer has is the cost advantage of having no customer – owner conflict
and flexible pricing. However for the time being it appears that the advantages
of demutualisation outweigh the disadvantages. This was clearly evident when
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one of the mutual marine insurance providers BMM demutualised in 1999 in
order to access additional capital and expand their activities.

6.6

What does demutualisation mean for the mutual marine insurance

industry and what are the critical factors that influence demutualisation?

There are no such studies carried out in the mutual marine industry. However
the studies carried out in the general insurance industry identified, free cash
flow, access to capital, wealth expropriation at the time of conversion, expense
preference behaviour and loss ratio as critical factors that influence
demutualisation. Applying the results of the above study in combination with
P&I research reports published by Elysian Insurance Services (2000), Marsh
(2000) and HSBC (2000), eight critical factors namely free cash flow, the free
reserves, the access to capital, the size of the insurer, the management and
administrative expenses i.e. AER, underwriting losses, the rate of return on
investment income and the ratings given by S&P were taken up for study to
examine their influence on demutualisation of mutual clubs. To examine the
Cash flow, the Supplementary call percentage, Cost of premium as percentage
of ETC and Release call percentage were considered. To analyse the Free
reserves/Surplus, the total free reserves per GT of entered tonnage, the free
reserves as percentage of call income, the ratio of free reserves to net
outstanding claims and the ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims
outstanding were examined.
The analysis data relating to the 13 P&I clubs who are members of the IGA
revealed that
•

Skuld and Steamship mutual has strong tendency towards
structural change, which may be merger or alliance or
demutualisation.
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•

London and Japan club showed weak tendency towards
structural change

•

Out of 13 clubs 5 clubs have shown strong tendency in
different degrees.

•

Other clubs are favourably positioned to undergo structural
changes in the coming years.

6.7

Recommendations
1. Mutual clubs should reorient themselves to meet the following challenges and
trends
•

Globalisation markets

•

Consolidation and Specialisation

•

Increased competition
•

New competitors

•

New products

•

Alternative distribution channels

•

Changes in customer needs

•

Changes in the security perception of vessel operation

•

Reducing margins and increasing costs

•

Increasing sophistication and complexity of information technology
including e-commerce

•

Increased risk requiring innovative risk transfer vehicles.

2. Mutual clubs should not shy away from changing basic structure if the
circumstances especially the changing needs of shipowners so warrant.
3. The mutual marine insurance industry should be alive to changes in the general
insurance industry and apply knowledge taken from other industries to marine
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sector. This includes mainly customer behaviour, distribution, perception and
service.
4. The mutual marine industry should keep their option open to the following
six key imperatives facing any financial service organisation.
•

Mergers and Acquisitions

•

Risk management (ability to identify, manage and allocate risk exposure
on global basis)

•

Time to market new products and services

•

Customer management

•

Corporate repositioning and branding

•

Non interest expense reduction by shared services, outsourcing and
competitive positioning

5. Mutual clubs should keep in view that their brand values which relied on
shipowners trust and trust are no longer enough to provide sustainable
competitive advantage to them.
6. Mutual clubs should be aware of the implications of technological development
especially the developments in information technology, evolving roles of state
including deregulation and implementation of anticompetitive and anti trust laws.
7. Mutual clubs should realise that the development of information technology has
broken the information barrier between the shipowner and underwriter. This in
turn has contributed to the commoditisation of insurance services that encourages
competition by products on the basis of price rather than historical relationships.
8. Mutual clubs should be aware of threats from non-marine insurance providers
who control communication networks and the gateways could set themselves up
as brokers directing customers to the best product. In such a scenario the loyalty
of customer would increasingly be to the broker rather than the producer of the
product or the one who actually provides the insurance service.
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Appendix A
Volume of Business of P&I Mutual Clubs
(in terms of number of vessels)

Name of the Club
American Club
Britannia Club
Gard
Japan
The London Club
The North of England
The Shipowners Club
Skuld
The Standard Club
Steamship Mutual
The Swedish Club
The UK Club
The West of England
Total

1995
900
3139
4984
9620
920
1151
21120
4912
2154
3398
447
5000
6900
64645

1996
960
3268
4878
9480
941
1311
22260
5136
2245
3898
463
5450
6700
66990

1997
915
3426
4666
9074
955
1382
23756
5500
2234
4373
495
5000
6800
68576

1998
912
3396
4596
8563
956
1491
24593
5577
2303
4684
540
5000
6750
69361

1999
1037
3489
4418
7948
952
1775
21827
5521
2400
4815
610
5350
6900
67042

Source :P&I Review of 2000,HSBC Insurance Brokers Limited, Marine Division.
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2000
NA
3736
4257
7387
931
1648
23500
5133
2550
4974
722
5665
6000
66503

Appendix B
Volume of Business of P&I Mutual
(In terms of Entered Tonnage in Million GT)
Name of the Club
American Club
Britannia Club
Gard
Japan
The London Club
The North of England
The Shipowners Club
Skuld
The Standard Club
Steamship Mutual
The Swedish Club
The UK Club
The West of England

1995
4.1
59
74.5
43.3
23.8
11.2
5.6
27.2
29.5
61.1
8.6
91
32.4

1996
4.8
63
79.3
46.3
26.6
14
6.2
28.9
30.9
63.1
8.9
91
35.7

1997
6.1
69
84.1
46.5
25.7
16.5
6.6
32.6
33.5
68.5
9.8
91
38

1998
6.8
69.1
86.3
47.2
25.16
19
6.9
38.1
38.1
67.8
10.4
91
38.3

1999
8.8
73.5
89.3
47.9
24.83
22.1
7.4
40.5
41
63
10.9
91
38.7

2000
6.2
79
89.8
48
25.81
21.3
8.2
39.6
42
64.1
13.7
90.3
37

Source: P&I Review of 2000,HSBC Insurance Brokers Limited, Marine Division.
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Appendix C
Analysis of factors that influence structural changes in mutual clubs.

Name of the
club
American

Suppl.
call
above
12%
X

ETC
above
110%

Release
calls
above
25%
X

Free
Reserves
per GT
above US$4
per GT
X

FR to
call
income
above
150%

R1
above
50

R2
above
25

X

Britannia

X

Gard

X
X

X

X

X

London
North of E
X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

Total
points
4
3

X

5
X

X

X
X

X

3

3
X

X

6
4

X

X
X

Rating
of BB or
below
S&P

X

X

3
X

UK Club
West of E

X

X
X

Investment
income less
4%

3
X

Standard

Swedish

AER
above
8%
X

X

X

Shipowners

Steamship

Market
share
above
10%

X

Japan

Skuld

Access to
Capital

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

5

X

5

X

4

X

87

X

5

Appendices
Appendix A Volume of Business of P&I Mutual Clubs
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